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In this t he sis four secular approaches to ethics which 
purport to either esta b l i sh or lay the theoretical f o und a -
tion for estab l is h ing objective ethical norms come in f o ::-
a critical e x ami nation: These are: 1 ) the naturalism of 
Richard Ta y lor, 2) t h e l i nguistic co nventionalism o f J ohn 
R. Searle, 3) t h e existentialist ch oi ce of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
an d 4) the op e nly "ontological" strategy of He n ry Ve atch. 
Each of t h e a b ov e t h eor i es seeks to establish, explicit l y 
or .implicitl y , a normati v e ethical re q uirement to respect 
the rights, f r e e d om, et€:. of other h uman beings. Using a 
consist e nt i ndividualistic egoism as a foil, it is argued 
that e ach o f th e four theories considered fails, on th e 
basis of it s own initial assumptions concerning "g oodness, " 
"ri ght n ess," "obligat i on," the ontolo g ical s t atus of man, 
etc., to t ur n back t he challenge posed by the egoist. Ea ch 
o f t h e fo u r th e o ries is viewed as an unsuccessful att e mpt 
to derive a n o rmative ethical "o u ght" from a f a ctual, de-
scri p tive ''is." In the final section of the thesis t he four 
secula r et hic al theories are contrasted with athei s ti c ally 
b ased t heor y o f st h ics, and it is argued that the latter h a s · 
a dist in ct a d va nta g e over the former with re g ard to the 
establis hment o f objective ethical norms. Finall y , episte-
molog i cal p rob l ems associated with t h e establishment of the 
foundational assumptions of all t h e theories are briefly 
cow.me n ted on. 
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Dostoevsky declared that if God didn't exist everything 
would be possible, and Sartre called this declaration "the 
very starting point of existentialism." 1 At the other end 
of the philosophical spectrum post-World War II analytic 
philosophers have largely reduced ethics to meta-ethics--
a n alysis of the lan g uage of morals with little or no con-
cern for wha t Henry Veatch calls an ontology of morals . 
That both of these approaches deprive ethics of any founda-
tion ante r em and lead to an unbridled relativism shall be 
argued here. Indeed, I· shall argue for the wider thesis 
that the existence of objective ethical norms requires the 
existence of a transcendent source of such norms, and here 
I am referring to something akin to the classical Judaeo-
Christian co n cept of God. At this point, however, I merely 
wish to point out the fact that there exists a certain un-
easiness in contemporary society concerning the status of 
ethical injunctions. A pervasive relativsm has led to free-
dom from "old fashioned " conventional morality, but nothing · 
firm has been put in its place. A general malaise grips 
us, an ill-defined feeling that something is not right in 
t h e realm of ethical values. As a result there has been,in 
the last fifteen years or so, a recrudescence of interest 
in moral values that are somehow "out therell independently 
--
2 
of our desires and whims, and a correlative dissatsifaction 
with ethical systems and meta-ethical appro a ches which fail 
to p rovid e or even ackn owl edge the possibility of such 
values. This dissatisfaction exists not only on the level 
of the "cornmon man, 11 but also on that of t h e professional 
philosop he r of et hic s. Th e naturalist, Richard Taylor, dep-
recates "the baggage of what has pretentiously come to be 
k nown as "metaet hi cs, 112 finding discussions of what is meant 
by this or t ha t ethic al term "poor substitutes for what a 
wi s e man ought t o t hink about things of human significance. 113 
Henry Veatch, wh o approaches eth i cs fr om a n ont o l ogical 
st a ndpoint dia metrically opposed to that of Taylor, nonethe-
less applauds his commen ts about meta-ethics. Veatch would 
solve the problems of meta-ethics by providing an ontologi-
cal b asis t h rough what h e describes as meta-meta-ethics. 
Mary War nock vj_ews met a -•ethics as trivializing the subject 
of ethics. Speaking of English analytic moral philosophers, 
sh e ma intain s U ia t "they are inclined to belie v e that, in 
t eory a t J east, ab s o l u tely a 1 y t hing c ou ld count as a moral 
0 --i ni o n, o r a mo .:"a l p -::-inc i;:i l e , pro vi ded it was framed in 
t ,e ',~ay 12.i d d own . or s : c:h } :.-incipl1;;s, and used, as the y a.,_e 
/. 
u.--.ed , to g uide co r:duc· ,_. 11 ·'£ 3u h relativism ste :m:nin g from ilE?~a-
e thics and, to an even gr . ~t E ~ ex t ent acc o rc i ng to Wa~noc k , 
from Marxist so ciol o g y, c ons t....tut P s the "o uts t .•nding problem 
in ethics at the p re s e n t time." 5 L c i t i ::'ig t he above a utho rs 
it is not my int~nt to di s p arage meta-e t hic s in genera : , but 
rather to ca l ] Rt t entio ~ to what is perceived by t he m to be 
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a neglect of the "meat II of actual ethics and/or a relativism 
characteristic of the meta-ethical approach, without implying 
that these faults are inherent in meta-ethics. 
I have said that I shall argue that objective ethical 
n orms are impossible without a transcendent a uthor. It will 
be helpful at this juncture to give some idea of what is 
meant by "objective," although this is no place for a full 
fledged discussion of the relevant epistemological and meta-
physical questions. First, by way of contrast, I do not mean 
by "objective," conventional, either social or linguistic. 
I do mean by "objective," ethical norms t h at are not depend-
ent upon being perceived and acknowledged by a human subject, 
but rather are "out theie 11 independently of being recognized 
by this or that individual or community. Since I do not take 
a nat uralist position (in the sense of holding that normative 
ethical state ments are verifiable by empirical observation) 
this c oITLmits me to a belief in the reality of non-empirical 
entities, to some form of metaphysical realism. This not 
being a thesis on metaph y sics p e r se, I shall merely state 
and not defend my realist presupposition here. However, there 
is an objection that needs to be addressed , if only briefly, 
at this point. By defining "objective" as I do, am I set-
ting up the ter ms of the problem in such a way that my the-
sis must necessarily follow? Am I guilty of a petitio 
principii? I do n ot believe that this is the case; however, 
my ar g ument against such a charge will be deferred. 
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Objective ethical norms may be viewed as absolute, in-
violable, and "rationally unquestionable" principles. In his 
analysis of ethical positions James Fishkin defines the above 
position as ''absolutism." He presents two other positions 
which he cons i ders objectivist. The second is identical to 
the first except for the withdrawal of the claim that moral 
judgments are rationally un questionable. The third, which he 
calls "minimal objectivism" drops the inviolability criterion, 
allowing that ethical judgments may be formulated as prima 
facie propositio n s. In addition, Fishkin makes reference to 
wh at he calls 11 t h e appropriate moral perspective." The third 
form of objectivism is such that: "One's judgments are ob-
-j e ctively valid ; that is, their constant application to 
everyone is supported by considerations that anyone should ac-
cept, were he to v iew the problem from what is contended to 
be the appropria t e moral perspective. 116 This perspective is 
see n as some sort of impartial viewpoint, either expressed 
informally (e.g., the Golden Rule), or formally in a moral 
decis i on procedure. The first two of Fishkin's positions 
would qualify for the title "objective" as I am using the 
term, and, ass umi n g that there is a single "appropriate moral 
persp 'ective" so would the third. Obv i ously I am allowing 
c onsiderable latitude in my operative notion of "objective." 
No attempt will be made here, for example, to determine 
whether or not nor mative ethical judgments must be inviol-
able o r merely prima facie. I do not believe that it is 
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necessary to provide definitive answers to questions such as 
this in order to ad dr ess the wider question of whether objec-
tive moral judgments are possible in the absence of a trans-
cendent author. However~ the question as to whether or not 
the r e is an ''appropriate moral perspective" will occupy us 
further. 
In connection wi th Fishkin's notion of "absolutism" we 
have seen a reference to "rationally unquestionale" princi-
p l - s. It wi l l be useful to say a few words about the con-
cept of rationality, or " reasonablen e ss" employed by Fishkin 
a l on g with many other writers on ethics. Two rather differ-
ent not ions of "rati o nal" (or "reasonable") are to be en-
count e red in d iscussions of morality. The first is the 
strict, narr ow concept of being consistent with the laws of 
formal logic (e.g., non-contradiction, excluded middle, etc.). 
The second, a n d by far the more common, is a broader concept 
that i s much harder to define, and which is often used in 
a slyly tendentious manner. I might try to capture a general 
idea of this broader use with such p h rases as "what any rea-
sonable man would accept," or "concerning which doubt and 
skepticism is inappropriate." It is rather obvious that an 
author can attach this sort of idea to his pet moral prin-
ciples in order to avoid having to defend them by actually 
giving reasons for them. The terms "rational" and "reason-
able" have a strong positive connotation, and once an author 
can "baptize" his fundamental ethical principles with these 
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terms he is on the way to having them accepted. Particular-
ly where such appellations are never explained and are casu-
ally accepted by the reader, he may consciously or uncon-
sciously come to attach the f1rst, logically rigorous, mean-
ing of these terms to the author's precepts. Fishkin is not 
guilty of attempting to pull off this sort of sleight of hand, 
openly acknowledging that he is using "rationally unquestion-
able" in a wide, not precisely defined sense: "Per h aps it 
is a necessary truth, if such a thing is possible in ethical 
matters. Or if it is not a necessary truth, it has a kind of 
apodeictic basis that renders further skepticism inappropri-
ate. 117 Kant's "categorical imperatives" provide an illus-
tration for Fi shk in of €thical injunctions on behalf of which 
such a claim of being "rationally unquestionable'' has been 
made. Certainly Kant would not claim that someone who denied 
' 
any categorical imperative necessarily committed a for mal 
logical fallacy in doing so. 
Other writers do not echo Fishkin's restraint, but rather 
make free use of the label "rational" to propagandize their 
own ethical positions. Thus Paul Kurtz writes that". 
human beings can take a rational approach to a moral life, 
which would include a moderation of appetites and a compassion-
ate concern for the needs of others .. The aim of a ra-
tional morality is to maximize individual freedom, self-
realization, and human happiness throughout society. 118 How 
or why moderation (rather than unrestrained indulgence) of 
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appetites, compassionate concern (rather than t otal indiffer-
ence) for the needs of ot h ers, ind i vidual freedom (rather 
than to t alita ri an suppression) e£c. are more rational than 
their oppo s it e s Kurtz doesn't explain. A similarly tenden-
tious us e of :ra tionality is seen in Farber's c omment that 
"The achi e vement o f a predatory entrepreneur--tha t is, the 
use of ot her men merely to advance one's own interests--can-
not be accepted at face v alue in any rational ethics." 9 
Surely there is no im p li c ation here that the ethical guide-
lines employed by a predatory entrepreneur necessarily vio-
late the canons of formal logic. The concept of a "ration-
al morality" employed by Kurtz and other moder!:. humanistic 
authors has a long and honourable pedigree, going back to 
Plato and Socra te s. Howe v er , t 1e se early rationalists based 
ethics on an ontological foundation which has long been aban-
don ed by Kurtz and ot h er modern writ e rs of the empirical, 
huma ni st tradition. For Plato something was good if it 
participated in the Form, Goodn e ss. Such participation was 
to be ascertained by focusing the "eye of the mind" up o n the 
world of t h e forms, a process that was greatly facilitated 
by ignoring the desire s of the body. That _he forms are 
real (indeed that they are the only things that are fully so) 
is a tenet of Platonism. For somethi n g to be rational or 
reasonable means that it is a pp rehended by the mind as it 
focuses upon the forms. Thus the e r.tire notion o f rational-
ity, a wide notion that goes well beyond the canons of 
formal logic, is intimately and intricately co nne cted to an 
ontology of eternal, unchanging forms for classical Platonic 
ratio n alism. Most Plato n ists would agree with Kurtz that 
such things as concern for others, individual freedom, etc. 
are rational in the classical sense. They, however, have 
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an ontology upon which to base su ch a cla i m whereas Kurtz and 
others like him do not. In th e case of the latter claims that 
compassionate concern, freedom, etc. are "r ational" are left 
hanging in the a i r. They are using the borrowed capital of 
classical rat ion alism which they hav e, in theory, long sinc e 
abandoned. Thus without an un dergirding ontology those who 
wou ld u se "reason" or "rationality" in ethics are limited to 
critiquing ethical s y stems from the standpoint of internal 
coherence. They may no-t legitimately use " reason" as a tool 
for establis hing a priori this or that ethical proposition. 
METHODOLOGY 
An apodictic proof of the sort of universal negative 
thesis which I am advancing is impossi b i e. I am examining 
the thesis that there cannot be objective ethical norms with-
out a transcendent (pers onal) source of those n o rms. If 
true, this thesis entails that every a ttempt to demonstrate 
the e xi st en ce of such norms independent of a transcendent 
s ou rce must necessarily fail. Even if it were feasible 
(which it here is not) to consider every historical attempt 
to found objecti v e ethical norms on a non-transcendent basis, 
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it would not be possible to anticipate all future attempts to 
complete this project. Therefore, for practical reasons I 
shall p roceed by selecting for critical examination certain 
representative secular ethical theo r ies which attempt to put 
ethics on an objecti v e basis. For each t h eory selected I 
shall show that it fails by being unable, on the basis of its 
own initial a ssum p tions and wit h out an explicit or implicit 
ad hoc "ega:)..itarian" maneuver, to refute the objections of 
a consis t ent indi v idualistic e goism. Th at is, in each of 
the s e c u lar theoYies considered an attempt is made to derive 
a pri n ciple whereby th e rights (or at least a certain partic-
ular ri gh t--e.g., to have promises k ept) of ot h ers must be 
respected equall y wit h one's own. I argue that such a pr i n-
c i ple neither follows logically from nor is even congruous 
with the initial me taphys i cal and other a x iomatic assumptions 
of t h ese t h eor i es. Th u s in or C:er to derive the "egal i tarian" 
principle, an ad hoc assumption must be added along the way. 
I hope t o show that, in contrast, atheistically based 
ethical t he or y requires no such ad hoc move. While an ass ump-
tion mus t indeed be added to the initial metap hysical prem-
ises of a theistic ethics in order to obtain a requirement to 
respec t t he ri gh ts of others, I argue that this asslLmption 
is con g ruous with the initial premises of t he theory, and 
prima facie pl a usible, whereas in the cas e s of the secular 
theories exa mined such is not the case. Rather, in these 
latter instances the ad hoc character of the "egalitarian" 
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assumption is all too evident. Thus I am claiming a distinct 
advantage for atheis t ically based ethics vis-a-vis the four 
secular theories examined. It d oes not follow from my claim, 
if substantiat e d, that all attempts to derive objective eth-
ical norms on a non-theistic basis must, in principle, fail. 
Any such attempts which differ significantly from the four 
approaches which I critically examine would have to be evalu-
ated on the basis of their individual merits. Nevertheless, 
it remains true that I have come to grips with three of the 
more prevalent non-theistic 20th century approaches to et hi cs 
plus the "throwback" ontological approach of Veatch. If I 
have successfully shown that these non-theistic approaches 
are unable to make a cogent case for the existence of objec-
tive ethical norms, this finding is of no small significance. 
The procedure which I follow here leads naturally to 
questions c oncerning the selection of first principles or 
axioms, and to consi de ration of the basic epistemological 
question: "How do we know anything?" Here I will have s ome-
thing to say about the sources of firs t principles and the 
circularity of metaphysical arguments in general. These 
considerations will lead to t h e q u estion of whether or not 
my thesis results in epistemological skepticism and a reduc-
tion of epis t emology to psychology. Finally I shall return 
to the matter of the ontological basis of ethics, mentioned 
briefly in the introduction. 
I have selected four representative ethical theories 
for critical appraisal. The first is what I shall label the 
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egalitarian naturalism of Richard Taylor. In this type of 
theor y the good is defined in terms of actual human desires 
and "needs," the sorts of things that behavioral scientists 
can get a grip on. This type of theory (and Taylor's is an 
example of t his) is almost always accompanied by some sort 
of egalitarian/altruistic assumption in order to ward off 
the individualistic eg o ist when dealing with conflict of de-
' 
sires/needs sit u ations. The second theory which shall come 
under scrutiny is the linguistic conventionalism of John 
Searle, and his attempt to do ethics wit h out ontology shall 
be shown to be f u tile. Nex t I shall take up the existential 
choice approach of the early Sartre. While it may so und 
strange to include Sartre in a selection of purportedly ob-
jectivistic et h ical theories, there are certain key tenets 
of his existentialist ethics which Sartre regarded as abso-
lute and unchallengeable. It is these which shall be called 
into question. The last theory about which I shall comment 
is the openly ontological approach of Henry Veatch which, 
while on the right track for the establ i shment of objective 
ethical principles, doesn't go far enough. 
By focusing on these four modern theories I am obviously 
neglec t ing classical approaches such as utilitarianism and 
Kantian deontologisrn. While I shall not address separately 
these and other historical theories, much of what I have to 
say will be relevant to them. For instance, the egoistic 
critique of Taylor can be applied, mutatis rnutandis, to 
utilitarianism. Furthermore, comments (not necessarily 
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negative) pertaining to intellectual insight wh ich shall be 
made in the final sec t ion on epistemolog y will b e g ermane to 
deontological ethical systems. I shall try to point out the 
more important of such applications as I go along. 
The re are many areas which are rele v an t to this thesis 
but which will n ot be ad d ressed e x cept for a few passing 
c ommen ts. Since I am dealing with approaches to ethics which 
purport to establish objective norms in some meaningful sense 
of this term, I shal : n o t discuss openly subjectivist et h i-
cal formulations (e.g., Ayer, Westermarck, Benedict) per se. 
Also such a question as whether or not subjectivism is self-
refuting, recently discussed in a very interesting manner b y 
C. Be h a n Mccullagh , is beyond the scope of this t h esis. 
There is one obvious point with respect to relativism which 
may be mentioned. If my negative thesis is accepted and at-
tached to an ass umption of atheism, by logical n ecessity we 
a re left with so c e fo rm of rela t ivism as the only remaining 
et h ical p o sition possible (or amoralism if this is regarded 
· as a n ethical rather than a meta-et h ica l posit i on) . As 
Hancock has pointed out, the dis t inction between ethi c s and 
meta-ethics is not at all easy to draw. Indeed Fishkin re -
gards subjectivism itself as an "essentially" meta-ethical 
p h enomenon. It f ollows fro m t h e ~ ove that I shal l not here 
deal with the et h ical a s s ~mptions of Marxi t sociology (class 
determined ethics) whic h , as Mary Warnock po ' nts c c1t, has be-
come a powerful influence upon ethical th :o r .. .:..n re f'e nt 
years. This is, after all, a form of rel a ti v i sm, although 
.. 
not without a tension produced by certain absolutistic pre-
sumptions. Finally, I shall not address the thorny free 
will vs determinism question other than to state the unde-
fended assumption that human beings may be held morally re-
spons ~ble for their actions. 
EGALITARIAN NATURALISM: RICHARD TAYLOR 
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I have chosen t h e label "egalitarian naturalism" to 
describe Ta y lor's ethics: 1) to distinguish it from classi-
cal utilitarianism, an d 2) to emphasize the fact that an 
egalitarian assumption accompanies his naturalism, in contra-
disti n ction from an egoistic naturalism. Where uti l itarian-
ism (e . g ., Bentham) regarded pleasure as the good, Taylor 
takes into account the existing diversity of h uman needs and 
desires, decl a r i ng that good and evil are to be defined in 
terms of t heir satisfaction and frustration, respectively. 
Thus for Taylor there is no distinction between the "is" and 
the "ought." Rejecting the classical tradition of Plato, 
Aristotle, etc. whereby reason was given the pr i macy over 
will in ethics, Taylor un abashedly r e verses t h eir roles. 
There is no "na t u ral morality" fo r Tay lo r in the sense of a 
morality somehow d i scoverable by reason and which is su p erior 
t o a "convent io nal morality." In this respect Taylor fi nds 
no significant difference between Plato and Kant's "natural 
14 
law," categorically rejecting both. Sharply c ir cumscribing 
the role of reason i n ethics, Ta y lor declares that, in accord-
ance with mor a l voluntarism (his v ie\ ,,,.): 11 
••• it is only 
b eca u se a man has a wil l --t h at is, because he has desires, 
passions, wa n ts, inclinations, or in short, because he pur-
sues ends or objects of desire--that any distinctions of good 
and e v il ever arise in the first place. The original goodness 
of so methin g consists si mply in its being desired, and the 
e v il of a ny state of a ff airs c o nsists si mply in its f ru stra-
t i on of desire ... the question cannot e v en legitimately 
arise of wh et h er what a man wills corresponds with what is 
rati onally good. Reason, by itself, ca n mak e no distinction 
whatever bet ween what i-s good and what i s not . .,lO The will 
is t h at which dete c ts good and evil in an y t hing for Taylor, 
since i t is t h e will which detects ac tu al d e s ires. The role 
of reas on is ess e nt i ally to discover th e op tima l mea ns to at-
tain desired e n ds. Goodness "is s imply the satisfaction of 
needs and desires, or wha t ca n gene ra ll y be described as t h e 
fulfillment o f purposes. Th e gr e ate s t good for any indi v idu-
al can accordin g l y be nothing but t h e total satisfaction o f 
his needs, wh ate v er these may be. 111 While this is his t h eo-
ret i cal posit i on, Taylor does n o t hold that such a total 
satisfaction is pr a ct i cally possible. Nonet h eless, Taylor is 
r i gorously cons i stent in defining good and evil in terms of 
actual desires a nd needs, h o lding t h at in and of t h emselves 
desires are wit h out moral significance. Thus " ... desires or 
purposes themselves can be neither good nor bad. The mer e 
fact that a desire exists, that something is wanted, or that 
somet h ing is regarded as a goal, entaiis that the desire 
should be fulfilled or t h e goal achieved; that is to say, 
that such satisfaction would be a good for him who wants it. 
It matters not in the least what the desire is. 1112 Else-
where Taylor makes his basic point in the following terms: 
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" ... things are, originally, good precisely because they are 
sought, and evil because they are shunned. The seeking and 
shunning is what gi v e s rise to the distinction between good 
and evil. It is, therefore, an empty injunction to say that 
men ought to pursue good and avoid evil, as this amounts only 
to saying they should seek what they seek and avoid what they 
avoid . 1113 For Taylor it is not an open question whether or 
not the things me n seek.are good. 
The notions of right and wrong are derivative in Taylor's 
ethics, being, like those of good and evil relative to the 
actual desires and needs of men. Put simply, any action 
which furthers the satisfaction of actual needs or desires 
is right; conversely, an action which frustrates such satis-
faction is wrong~ All of this is to be seen against the back-
drop of Taylor's view of human nature. As human beings we 
"are bas i cally egoistic or selfish and look first and last 
. . f . 11 d d . 1114 to the satisfaction o our own wi s an esires ... Fur-
thermore, Taylor acknowledges that a morality may be built 
upon the e goistic satisfaction of their desires by the 
16 
naturally superior (in terms of actual ability--physical, in-
tellectual, etc.) at the expense of the inferior. This is 
the morality of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias which "was evi-
dently not refuted by Socrates, and has probably never been 
refuted by anyone else--although it has been rejected by vir-
tually every moralist who has considered it." 15 As we shall 
see Taylor's purportedly objective system of morality proves 
to be no match for a consistent egoism either. While to my 
knowledge Taylor nowhere specifically labels his morality as 
a species of ''objectivism," I believe that t h is is a fair 
characterization even though he occasionally uses language 
which has a subjectivistic ring (e.g. things are good "pre-
cisely because they are sought." Presumably Taylor would 
agree with Rollo Handy that the question of what actually 
are human needs and desires is to be answered by behavioral 
scientists through studyi n g the facts of hQman behavior. 
These facts would be objectively estab l ished, and, for Taylor, 
coupled with the a priori assumption that the satisfaction 
of these needs and desires is good. Even if this line of 
approach were to be acknowledged as valid, however, it would 
not be such a straightforward endeavor. The presuppositions 
and assumptions employed by behavioral scientists in the 
collection and interpretation of their data would have to 
come under scrutiny as well as the data itself. However, I 
shall not develop this point; my assault on Taylor shall 
come from another quarter. 
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Since I intend to utilize consistent egoism as a weapon 
against Taylor (as well as the other moral positions to be 
critically examined), it would b e adv i sable to deal with an 
objection which is designed to in v alidate my line of attack 
before it can get started. This is the charge that egoism 
is a form of amoralism and t herefore ca nn ot be le g itimately 
used as a foil against various moral positions. Ta y lor him-
self takes t hi s line, declaring that "s e l f-seeking, insofar 
as it is just that, is morally neutral in both animals and 
men .
1116 He notes that "It is simpl y a fact t h at men d o nor-
mally so act. To regard any man as bla ~ eworthy or p r a ise-
worthy for this is as pointless as it would be to p raise or 
bl h . f h . - h II 17 a~e .im or. aving a mot .er. Th at Taylor is in no posi-
tion to thus disqual ify egois m as a moral position can be 
seen from an examinat ion of the fou n dation for his own posi-
tion. It is, h e acknowledges, simp ly a fact t h at men do 
have certain felt needs and desires, yet it is upon this 
fact that Taylor builds his fundamental notions of good and 
evil. If he is entitled to p roceed in this manner, then he 
cann o t reasonably object to the e g oist who, more narr owl y, 
operates fr om the perspective cf the indivi d ual's needs and 
desires. This is s u fficient mention of this point for the 
moment; the difference between Taylor and rational egoism 
will become cle a r er when we examine the e g alitarian assump-
tion of the form er . 
It is, of cour s e, stil l possible to attack egoism as a 
moral position without relying upon Taylor. The gene r al 
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argument would be that individualistic egoism lacks the prop-
er "mtoral poi· nt of vi· e\·T, 11 "mora-1 t · 11 t th · v perspec ive, e c., e im-
plication being th a t morality is by its very nature o t her-
cent e r e d. Thi s maneuver is obviously question begging with 
respect to egoi s m, crudely attempting t o rule it out of 
bounds by definitional fiat. If the e goist claims that his 
position is a moral one (e.g . , as Callicles claimed that the 
naturall y stro ng er ought to rule over the weaker in the in-
ter e st o f the ad v antage of the former), the altruist cannot 
le g it im atel y rule the egoist out of bo un ds f o r the pur p ose 
o f moral discourse by mea n s of an arbitrary definition which 
excludes the egoist's position. 
We have looked a t Taylor's bas i c notions of good and 
evil, r i ght and wrong. It is now time to see how they f un c-
tion in s i tuations i nvolving human in t ,2r action and conflict, 
in s h ort to ascerta i n what sort of ethics Taylor can derive 
f r om them. Ev en if human needs and desires were the same 
for all people, the human condition is such that it would 
n o t be possible for each individual to satisfy eac h of his 
felt needs and desires. Part of the reason for this situ-
ation is that others compete with him for l i mited satis-
fiers. Thus conflict is inevitable as various individuals 
attempt to satisfy their needs and desires. Of course, as 
Ta y lor correctly notes, there are significant differences 
from one individual to another in felt needs and desires. 
Conseque ntly, the situation is more complicated than if 
everybody had the same needs and desires. In any event 
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competition and conflict between individuals necessarily oc-
cur. How does Taylor deal with it? 
To answer the above question we must examine his notion 
of the " c orr.man g ood." Before coming to that point, however, 
it may be useful to say a few words about what Taylor calls 
the basic pr in ciple of all rules of conduct in human society: 
"the minimization of conflict and its consequent evil, and 
the maximization of cooperation and its consequent good. 1118 
Good and evil are, of course, understood in Taylor's terms. 
He points out, reasonably enough, the empir i cally verifiable 
b enefits tgoods) frequently derived from cooperative efforts 
among individuals, and the losses (evils) resulting from vio-
lent conflicts. However, it is not true that, in the case 
of mutual aggression, the possibility of evil to each aggres-
sor "is almost certain to outweigh any possibility of good. 1119 
There are frequent instances of violent conflict between in-
dividuals and between nations where the probability of vi c-
tory is so high for one part y that, viewed from that party's 
standpoint, a "good" outcome of the conflict is far more 
likely tha n an "evil" outcome. Even if Taylor were to con-
cede this point, however, this would not be especially 
damaging to his case if we were to grant the desirability of 
striving for what he calls the common good. 
While Taylor's for mula for the common good has a dis-
tinctly utilitarian ring to it, he wishes to distinguish it 
from classical utilitarianism (e.g., Mill) in two ways. 
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First, he replaces the rather simplistic and somewhat vague 
no t ions of ha ppiness and pleasure with the satisfaction of 
spe c ific felt h uman n e eds and desires. Second, he wants to 
a v o i d a f or mulation whic h would the o retically allow for a 
sit u ation i n whic h a maximum ag g re g ate satisfaction was 
achieved t h rough the frus t ration of a sig n ifi c ant number of 
d esires. Th us Ta y lor ad v ances the following general formula 
for the idea of the com_~on go o d: "The maximum fulfillment 
of all those ai ms t h at different men actually have, and the 
maxi mum satisfaction of their felt d e sires, whatever these 
may b e, at the least c os t--that is, with the minimum frus-
tration of precisely t h e same aims and desi ; es. 1120 In fair-
ness to Taylor, he does not pretend that this formula pro-
vides us with a precise ~eans of calculating how to achie ve 
th e common g ood; h owe ve r, h e d oes claim that it enables us 
to make "so me s or t of b egi n nin g in appraising var i ous insti-
tut i ons and states of affairs with respect to whet h er they do, 
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or do not, pro mote t he co rnrnon good." Taylor believes t h at 
by e va luatin g t h e tendencies toward advancing or re t ardin g 
the achi e vement o f the common good that the satisfaction of 
ac t u a l aims a n d de s ires h ave, we ca n empirically determine 
whi ch of th e se are and wh ich are not "morally acceptable or 
wort hy ." He thus seeks to avoid hav i ng to rely on so me 
sort of "esoteric moral intuition or Platonic insight" in 
making moral e v aluations of human ai ms and desires. We 
shou l d keep in mind here that for Taylor human desires are 
inherently amoral; we are entitled to talk about morally 
evaluating them only insofar as their respective satisfac-
tions make an impact on the achievement of the common good. 
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Tay lor's re ference to the "minimu nt frustration" of hu-
man a ims and desires implies that some degree of frustration 
is to be regarded as acceptable. This must be the case in 
view of the obvious fact that some desires can be satisfied 
only at the expense of the frustration of others. When such 
conflicts occur, Taylor holds that the "more pressing" 
(stronger, more important) desire should be satisfied at the 
expense of the less pressing, important, etc. desire. Where 
a single individual only is concerned this notion may be ac-
ceptable; however-, the important conflicts for Taylor's 
theor y are those invol v ing more than one person. In order 
to settle these he needs a method of ordering aims and de-
sires where different individuals are involved. At this point 
it may prove useful to look at a concrete example which 
Taylor uses to illustrate the application of his theory. 
This is the i n stitution of slavery. Taylor concedes to the 
advocates of negro slavery that the number of people whose 
aims and desires were in some way furthered by this institu-
tion outnu mbered those whose aims and desires were frustrated. 
On the debit side of the l e dger, however, he finds that 
"the very basic and supreme ends of any man: the interest in 
dwelling in freedom, in self-determination and inner pride, 1122 
etc. are sacrificed in order to achieve the economic advant-
ages of the larger group. Taylor concludes that the differ-
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ence in importance between the frustrated aims and desires and 
those satisfied via slavery is great enough to outweigh the 
quant i tative factor (whereby more people benefited from sla-
very than were injured by it), resulting in the determination 
that slavery mad e a net negative contribution to the common 
good a nd therefore deser v ed to be done away with. 
While it is l ik ely that most people would agree with 
Taylor's conclusion concerni n g slavery, this does not re-
quire that they arrive at it b y weighing more and less im-
portant hu.man aims and desires. Slavery is in fact more 
likel y to be rejected on religious grounds or on the basis 
of a purported insight into the equality of blacks and whites 
qua men. We have not yet looked at the method by which 
Taylor actually weighs conflicting aims and desires against 
ea ch other. In the case invol v ing only a single individual 
it is easy eno ug h in most instances for h im to prioritize 
c o nfli _t i ng ai ms and desires (e.g., to resist a craving for 
certai n foods whic h are likely to have deleterious conse-
quen c es fo r his health). The most important interest is 
the one which the person judges to mean the most to him, and, 
as Ta y lor poi nt s out, there is no appeal beyond th is assess-
ment. The above example is not, however, intended to imply 
that there are no ind ivi dua ls who prefer a relatively short 
life in which the y indulge as many sensual appetites as 
possible to a longer one in which they exercise some re-
straints. The large majority of mankind would, however, 
fall into the latter category. 
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Taylor wou l d employ what he calls "sympathetic projec-
tion" in the case of interpersonal conflicts of aims and de-
sires: "When confronted with conflicting interests in dif-
ferent men or groups, then, one can in a similar [to the 
case of a conflict in volving one individual alone] way deter-
mine, with some assurance, which should prevail by imagining 
that both interests are one's~ and asking oneself which 
.... h t 1123 means \,.._ e mo s . In the case of slavery one is to put one-
self ment ally in the position of a sla v e and "ask himself 
whether, in t ha t case, the interest of his that would be sac-
rificed [freedom ] wou ld mean more to him than the interest 
t h at would be served [the economic adva n tages accruing to him 
24 from slavery]." In other words, the moral agent is to 
place himself in an imaginary conflict situationwherehe must 
sacrifice one of these interests in order to achi eve the 
other, and, on the basis of his choice he is to decide the 
actual conflict situation b e tween d if ferent groups of people. 
Since he would almost certainly choose freedom over certain 
economic ad v antages, slavery is to be pr oscribed. While 
making a point of keeping his approach free from "presuppo-
sitions drawn from religion and traditional morality," 
Taylor acknowledges a similarity between his idea of "sym p a-
thetic projection" and the Golden Rule of the Gospels. 
Th e rational egoist is interested, either pr imarily or 
exclusively in the satisfaction of his own desires and aims. 
Taylor makes an inconclusive argument for the existence of 
altruistic motivations of human behavior. In each of the 
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purported instances of such behavior that he cites it is al-
ways possible to offer a counter e x planation based upon psy-
chological egoism. Th at is, it is possible to view any be-
havior as aimed at t h e satisfaction of some desire of the 
agent, no matter how unselfish it may appear on the surface. 
I do not propose to enter the debate between altruistic and 
psychological egoistic explanations of human behavior, as 
this is pri marily a psychological question concerning the 
realm of t h e "is" ra t h er than the "ought." (If an absolute 
ps y cholo g ical egoism t urned out to be true, t h is would have 
de v astating c onsequences for ethics as presently conceived; 
\ this problem, however, is be y ond the scope of this paper.) 
In his discussion of individuals' desires and aims Taylor 
mad e no distinction between "is" and "ought." A desire, by 
v irtue of its existence should be satisfied. The satisfac-
tions of all desires are goods. However, we h av e seen that 
in his d i scussion of interpersonal interactions he has given 
us two "oughts," the c ommon good ard the exercise of sy mpa-
t h etic projection, which he claims should be advanced and 
practiced, respectively. What claim can these have on a 
rationally consistent egoist? 
Taylo r is surely right in pointing out that there are 
situations in which it is to an individual's advantage to 
provide aid or assistance of some form to another. Such 
fa c tors as the likelihood of future reciprocation, the good 
will and respect of one's neighbors and associates, and 
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considerations of self interest often come into play and may 
provide the prospect of a long term net advantage accruing 
from an action in behalf of someone else. The conclusion to 
be drawn fro m this state .of affairs by the rational egoist 
is that he should perform actions in behalf of others when-
ever, in his b est judgment, the n et effect will be to his 
overall advanta g e. This is a far cry from adopting Taylor's 
abstract n o tio n of t h e co mmon good as an object to be pur-
sued. To put it briefly: Taylor has given no reasons why 
a consistent egoist should consider the common good or en-
gage in s ympath e tic pro j ection. Taylor is operating with 
different initial assumptions than those of the egoist; he 
has adopted an altruistic point of view which the egoist re-
jects. Th e latter considers the satisfaction of his own 
desires and aims as the ultimate criterionofwhat is "right" 
and "wrong,'' ignoring objections that this is inappr opriate 
as a "moral point of v iew." Taylor has no way of refuting 
the egoist here, on the basis of his (Taylor's) basic no-
tion s of good an d evil. If all desires and aims, considered 
in and of t h emselves, are amoral, the r e can be no objective 
basi s for regarding, say, the sadist ' s de sire t o inflict 
pai n on another person as less import a nt than the victim's 
desire to avoid such pain. The egoistic sadist has no de-
sire to engage in sympathetic projection, and Ta ylor has 
given him no reason to do so. Many other comparable ex-
amples could ' be provided. 
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The above conclusions appl y , mutatis rnutandis, to classi-
ca l utilitarianism and to modern systems of ethics built 
aro un d the notion of distributive justice accomplished by 
means of appropriate decision procedures or moral perspec-
tives (e.g., those of Rawls, Singer, Ackerman, and Dworkin). 
All require an initial acceptance of some sort of egalitarian 
principle, and have no force against an egoist who refuses to 
accept such a principle. One should be wary here of those 
who attempt to s muggle in s u ch a notion under the rubric of 
"reason" or "rationality." Even Henry Sidgwick, the avowed 
intuitionist utilitarian, in his di sc ussion of ultimate good 
in his classical The Methods of Ethics, acknowledged that he 
held "it no less reasonable [than sacrificing one's own hap-
piness for the g reater happiness of others] for an individual 
to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. 1125 An anala-
gous concession is made by Rawls to the egoist who refuses 
to be bound by the results of his decision procedure. He 
simply dismisses egoism as "incompatible with what we intui-
tively regard as the moral point of view. 1126 As we have al-
ready seen this question begging attempt to dis q ualify egoism 
from the universe of moral discourse will not wash. By mak-
ing this move Rawls tacitly admits that he has no way of re-
futing the egoist o ther than by definitional fiat . . 
An attempt actually has b een made to a rg ue vigorously 
for an egalitar ian principle by means of which the egoist or 
amoralist could be logically refuted. I refer to Alan 
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Gerwi th 's atte mpt in Reason and Morality to establish a prin-
ciple of universal res p ec t for the freedom and well-being of 
others. In my c omments I basically follow Fishkin's refuta-
tion o f Gerwith's ar gumen t. First, t h e argume n t: "Every 
a g e n t mus t c l ai m, at le a st implicitly, that he has rights 
to freedo m and well-bei n g for the sufficie n t reasons that he 
is a p ros p e c tive purposive agent. From the content of this 
c la im it follo ws, b y t he principle of universalizability, 
t h at a l l pr o specti ve purpo sive agents h ave rights to free-
dom and well- b eing. I f the a g ent denies this general i za-
ti o n, h e co n t r a dic t s h i mself. For t h en he would be i n the 
position of both affir ming a n d d e nying that b eing a pros-
pective purposive agent is a s u ffi c ient conditi o n of having 
rights to freedom and we l l -being. 1127 
In other words, if o ~:e ma k es t h e claim t h at he h as , on 
the basis of bein g a pr o spective purposive agent, rights to 
freedom and well-being {ho we v er t h ese notions are defined), 
then he must lo g ically grant such r i ghts to all prospective 
purposive agents (all or nearly all human beings). The 
core of Fishkin's attack on the above argument lies in the 
distinction between an agent affirming that his freedom and 
well-being are desirable goods (or even necessary goods in 
the instrumental sense of being essential to his effective 
functioning as a purposive agent) and a claim that he has a 
"right" to freedom and well-being. These are two different 
claims, and the second does not logica l ly follow from the 
first. Furt h ermore it is the second, stronger claim the 
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that Gerwith must saddle the egoist (or anarchist) with in 
order to prove his universalizability thesis. The egoist 
can readil y acknowledge that he aggressively seeks to main-
tain his own freedom and well-being and that he requires 
both to effectivel y function as a purposive agent without 
claiming that he has any "right" to either . Indeed bringing 
in the notion of "rights" as Gerwith does involves either a 
convention to which the egoist would feel no obligation to 
conform, or an assumption which he would reject, and Gerwith 
has no means to compel him l ogically to a contrary stance in 
either case. Ri ghts im p ly a grantor. Such a grantormust be 
either a human society or some segment thereof (including an 
individual) or a power transcending humanity. In the first 
c a se the rights are presumably conventional, and the egoist 
as we have seen has no reason to obey conventions unless 
this advances his own interests. As for the second alterna-
tive, the egoist would reject the ass umption of such a power 
since it would invalidate his basic posi t ion by requiring him 
to c on sider t h e desires and needs of others, in at least 
som e instances, ahead of his own. Fish ki n p oints out the 
foll owing with respect to subjectivist reaso ners (and ego-
ists may be so regarded in as much as they claim egoism as 
a p er s on al ethical choice and not a position that can be ob-
je c tiv e ly establ .ished; as long as he can show that purport-
edly objecti v e contrary ethical positions are unable to 
refute him, the egoist is satisfied): "Just as they have a 
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positive attitude toward their own freedom and well-being, 
they may grant that others have a similar attitude toward 
their own (respective) freedom and well-being--without any 
entitlements or moral re q uirements following for either par-
t .. 28 y. 
In the latter portion of his major ethical work, Good 
and Evil, Taylor makes extensive reference to "the virtue of 
compassion" as a motive for human actions. Here he presents 
ex a mples of behavior calculated to cause reactions of re v ul-
sion and admiration, respectively, on the part of the reader, 
and wa x es elo q uently about "noble and beautiful" deeds, and 
"the compassionate heart" which "makes men akin to the angels 
and the powers of li g ht, and snuffs out in them the real and 
f f d k d ·1 1129 ever present orces o ar ness an evi. All of this 
stands out in strange contrast to the first t wo-thirds of 
the bo ok where he argues, quite u ~emotionally, for a logical, 
objective naturalism. In the latter part of the book a turn 
toward some sort of intuitionism, emphastically rejected 
earlier, seems e v ident: "Most men, h owever, seem to know 
just what human goodness is when they see it, whether they 
have read treatises on morality or not, or whether or not 
they have tried to fathom its metaphysical foundations. 1130 
Taylor appears to retreat from the earlier confident expo-
sition of his naturalism into an intuitive appeal to a co-
mon moral consciousness of man, perhaps implicitly recogniz-
ing the weakness, particularly vis-a-vis egoism, of the 
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former approach . Thus when h e asks, late in t h e book, why a 
rational person should abandon his own . self-centered inter-
est in favor of the common good the timid reply is: 
lieve no real answer to this question exists. 1131 
SEARLE: LINGUISTIC CONVENTIONALISM 
"I be-
The separation between fact (what is the case--discover-
able by emp irical means) and value wh ich has characterized 
t h e analytic tradition in e t.::1ics b eg a n with G. E. Moore's 
assertion that g oodness was a "non-natural" property which 
could be so me how intui t_ed but not d iscovered by ordinary 
empirical means. The ernotivists brought the separation to 
its logical e x tre me, denying that goodness was any sort of 
prope r ty at all. In making the statement "Xis good," one 
was merely expressing how he felt about something and/or 
attempting to influence others to adopt a similar positive 
attitude to ward it. "Goodness" as an entity had no onto-
logical status for the e motivists. As a result, reasoned 
agreement a nd disagreement in ethical matters became im-
possible. The "is" was completely divorced from the "oug h t" 
despite Stevenson's reference to a qdescriptive element'' in 
ethical judgments. Causes, but not reasons were all that 
could ultimately be given for ethical judgments: "Area-
soned agreement ... is theoretically possibly only to the 
extent that agreement in belief [as to what are the actual, 
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empirically verifiable facts of the matter] will cause people 
to agree in attitude." 32 Stevenson did not maintain that 
a g reement of the former sort necessarily led to agreement of 
the latter sort. When and un der what conditions th i s occ urred 
would be a matter for sociology and psychology to explore. 
The uninhibited ethical relativism which such a nonco g -
nitive approach naturally led to was a source of discomfort 
for a number of later analysts. R. M. Hare atte mpted to nar-
ro w the gap bet ween fact and v alue with his "good reasons" 
approach to ethics, but came under fire from Foot and others 
for failing to make clear why certain facts instead of ot h ers 
should ser v e as reasons for e v a lu ative statements. Shortly 
thereafter John R. Searle burst upon the scene with his start-
ling (to those in the analytic tradition) claim that "ought" 
(e v aluati v e) stat ements could indeed be derived from "is" 
(d e scripti v e, factual) state ments. Indeed, he spoke of the 
"naturalistic fallacy fallacy'' in this con n ection. Henry 
Ve atch comments that "any sug g estion that an 'ought' might 
be derived from an 'is' would appear at once to revive the 
possibility t h at there are such things as natural la ws and 
natural norms after all. Since a law is nothing but a pre-
scribing or pro h ibiting of certain actions, it would surely 
seem to follow that if a law were held to be natural [as a 
conseq uence of its derivability from statements of fact], 
such a prescribing or pro h ibiting must itself be something 
natural, something that is justified literally by the nature 
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of the case." 33 In assessing the impact of his derivation 
of "ought" from "is" upon moral ph ilosophy Searle himself 
claims to have cut the ground out from under any argu..ment 
a gai n st deriving ethical st a tements from sets of statements 
of fact which is based upon the more general propo s ition that 
evaluative statements (of which ethical statements are re-
garded as a sub-class) can not follow from statements of 
fact: "The naturalistic fallacy as ap pli ed to ethics is just 
a special case of the general naturalistic fallacy. I have 
argued that the g~neral claim that one cannot derive evalua-
tive from descriptive statements is false. 1134 While there 
is considerable question as to whether the Moorean "natural-
istic fallacy" involves the derivation of evaluative fr om 
descriptive stateme n ts, it is at least clear here that 
Se arle's po int is to deny the imposs ibi lity of such a d e riva-
tion. 
The reas on that we are interested in Searle for the 
purpose of this thesis now be c omes clear. It is not as a 
developer of a s y stematic ethics that he requires our atten-
tion, but rather as a propounder of a meta-ethical position 
with implications for the po s sibility of a secular objec t ive 
ethics. If moral laws or obl ig at ion s are somehow prescribed 
by nature itself, we would cl e arl y have an objective ethics 
independent of any transcende n t source. Th at Searle's 
derivation of an "ought" from an "is" does not lead to such 
a situation (nor is it apparently intended to) will now be 
shown. 
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Searle sets out to disprove the thesis, by means of pre-
senting purported counter-examp l es, that no set of descrip-
tive stateme n ts can entail an evaluative statement. The r e 
are two somewhat independent instances that we shall consider. 
(Other e x amples are of the same type as the first.) Searle 
begins by attempting to show that the expression "valid de-
duc t ive a rgmnent" can be defined in purely descriptive terms, 
and that a description of a deductive argument can entail 
that it is a valid deductive argument. Th e reason that such 
a demonstratio n , if successful, will serve as a requisite 
counter-example is that Searle, along with J. O. Urmson (wi th 
wh om he is dis p uti n g co nc erning the counter-e x ample), both 
agree that "valid" is an evaluative expression. We can ac-
cept t h is claim in vi ew of the connotations t y pically evoked 
by "valid" in this context: good, worthy of approval, etc. 
Thus if it is possible to give a definition of "valid de-
ductive argument" using only descriptive, non-evaluative ex -
pressions, then s u ch a definition will entail an evaluative 
state ment of the form "Xis a valid deductive argument." 
The same point is also made by providing a non-evaluative 
description of a deductive argument which entails that it 
is a valid deductive argument. Searle proceeds as follows: 
11X is a valid deductive argu ment= df. 
Xis a deductive argument and the pre- 35 
mises of X entail the conclusion of X. 11 
He then provides the following description of an ar g ument 
which entails that it is a valid deductive argument: 
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"Xis a de ~ucti v e ar gume n t in which the p remises entail the 
conclusi on . 1136 Has Searle here given us an in s ta n ce of a 
descriptive state ment which entails a n ev al u ative one? Lest 
someone cla im that "entails" is an evaluative expression 
Sea rl e is prepared to substitute fu rt h e r descriptive expres-
sions fo r this term (e.g., "The premises are logically suf-
ficient for the conclusion." "It is inconsistent to affirm 
the premises and deny t h e c onclusion.") Any of t h ese alter-
nate descrip t ions, Searle maintains, would entail the evalu-
ative statement "X is a valid deductive argument." I almost 
find i t h ard to bel i eve that Searle is serious with this 
whole procedure. Granted that "va lid" i s an e v aluative term 
in the sense indicated above. He then defines this term us-
ing such e xpressions as have a l ready been noted (e.g., "Th e 
conclu si on follows logicall y from the premises" and claims 
t h at t h e substitute expressions are purely "des<;:riptions" 
which have no evaluat iv e force. I fail to see how one side 
of a tautological e xp ression can have the property of being 
"e v al u ative" while the other side lacks t h is same property. 
While the evaluative force of "valid" is present more on 
the surface, so to speak, than it is in the case of the al-
ternate expressi o ns (the eval uative connotation is more 
immediately obvious ) , this is not a reason for denying its 
presence in the substitute phrases. In each case a favor-
able e v aluation of a procedure conforming to the rules of 
inference of t h e classical syllogism is i mplied. To claim 
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that "valid" is evaluative and at the same time deny that 
the alternate expressions are, in the same sense, likewise, 
is as far as I can see no more than sleight of hand. 
Essentially the same conclusion CJUld be arrived at by 
viewing Searle's argument from anoth e r perspective. If the 
descriptive ex p ressions which he has substituted for "valid" 
(e.g., the p re mises are logically suf f icient for the conclu-
sion) are seen as having no evaluati v e connotation, we may 
ask how "vali d, " whi c h is defined in terms of them, can have 
such a con n otation. It would ap pear that Searle is making 
use of two meanin g s of "valid" in this case, one which is 
purely descriptive and another which has an e v aluative sense. 
He then makes an illici~ slide from the former meaning to 
the latter when he claim s that the evaluative expression can 
be defined strictly with non-evaluative terminology. · All he 
has actually do n e is to define a non-evaluative "va l id" in 
terms of another non-evaluative, descriptive phrase. 
Searle's more famous purported counter-example is his 
attempted derivation of an "ought" statement from a descrip-
tive ("is") one. This derivation, well known in the rele-
vant literature, is as follows: 
1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby pr omise to pay 
you, Smith, five dollars." 
2. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 
3. Jones placed h imself under (undertook) an obliga-
tion to pay Smith five dollars. 
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five 
dollars. 
5. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. 
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In the version of the derivation presented in Speech Acts 
Searle suggested prefacing each of the five statements with 
the expression " at time t" to avoid encumbering the proof 
with a ceteris paribus clause between steps 3 and 4, and again 
between 4 and 5, noting that he wanted to "leave out of the 
proof any explicit consideration of how extraneous factors re-
lease, discharge, or override the obligation undertaken when 
one makes a promise. 1137 It is not clear that this move com-
pletely obviates ceterip paribus considerations (e.g., at 
( 
time t Jones may have uttered his well known words while 
fully aware of important factors which militated against his 
paying Smith the five dollars), but we shall not pursue this 
point. 
I am prepared to concede that, in a way (to be discussed 
below), Searle's derivation succeeds. I shall not get em-
broiled in the technical criticism of the proof, but rather, 
taking my lead from Veatch focus upon its import. Specifi-
cally, just what sort of "ought" does Searle end up with in 
step five is the question to which we shall direct our atten-
tion. First, howe ve r, a few comments on how he gets to step 
five. Except for the move from step one to step two (where 
an additional empirical premise affirming the existence of 
all necessary and sufficient conditions whereby the uttering 
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of the presc r i be d words does indeed constitute the making of 
a promise) all the earlier steps direct ly entail the one im-
mediatel y followin g , although for formal neatness Searle is 
willing to add app ro pri at e tautolo g i c a l pr emises. For ex-
ample, Sear l e points o u t that on the basis of hi s anal y sis 
of promising it is "by de f inition, an act of placing oneself 
under an ob li gation. 1138 The appropriate tautological p re-
mise would be: "All p romi ses a r e acts of p lacing oneself 
under (unde rtak in g) an obligation to do the thing pro mised. 1139 
I n similar fas h ion Searle moves from step t hr ee to step fo u r , 
and the n from f ou r to f i ve. The rele va n t tautolo g ies are, 
re spe ctivel y : "All those who place the mselves under an ob-
ligation are (at th t im e when they so place themselves) un -
der an obligation 1140 and "if one is un de r a n obli g ati on to do 
something, t h en, as regards that obl i ga -ion , [my emphasis] 
one ought to do wh at one is under an obl i g a tion to do. 1141 
We are now in a position to see ju st what sort o f "ough t " 
Searle has left us with, a nd what it has t o do wi th moral 
philos ophy . That it is a rather peculiar sort of "o ught, " 
is indicated by Searle's ac knowledgement that " I may be 
justified in not doing what I ought to do as regards a p ar-
tic u lar obligation. 1142 In fact he refines step five in his 
discussi on of the derivation to read: "As regards his ob-
ligation to pay Smith fi v e dollars, Jones oug h t to pay Smith 
five dollars. 1143 Obviously, this does not mean, as Searle 
a g rees, that , all things considered, Jones ought to pay 
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Smith five dollars. The "ought'' is relative to the exist-
ence of the obligation. This ob ligation is what Searle would 
call an "institutional fact," and the point of his counter-
example "is to show that the classical model [whereby it is 
impossible to infer an evaluative statement from a descrip-
tive statement or statements except where the inference is 
mediated by an additional evaluative statement] is incapable 
f \ 
of de a l ing with instit u tional facts. '' · ~ Institutional facts 
"are i n de e d facts; but their existence, unlike the existence 
of brute facts, presupposes the e xist e nce of certain human 
institutions. It is only given t h e institution of marriage 
[for ex a mple] that certain forms of behavior constitute Mr. 
S 'th' . . J- .. 4 5 mi s marrying Miss ones. 
sy s tems of "constitutive rule s ." 
Institutions are, for Searle, 
These are rules which ac-
tua l l y make p o ssible or constitute a given activity rather 
than merely regulating activities wh ich exist independently 
of the rules. He cites the rules of chess , football, and 
other games a s exa mples of constitutive rules, and the rules 
of etiquette as an instance of regulative rules. Promise 
making is seen by Searle as an activity governed by constitu-
tive rules. Thus he compares the question, "How can making 
a pro mise create an obligation?" to the question, "How can 
scoring a touchdown create six points?" noting that "as 
they stand both questions can only be answered by citing a 
rule of the form 'X counts as Y. 11146 
Returning to the derivation of Jones' "ought," Searle 
notes that he 
" ... started with a brute fact, that a man 
uttered certain words, and thS'linvoked the in-
stitution in such a way as to generate institu-
tional facts by which we arrived at the conclu-
sion that, as regards his obligation, the man 
ought to pay another man five dollars. The whole 
proof rests on an appeal to the constitutive 
rule that to make a promise is to undertake an 
obligation, and this rule is a meaning rule of 
the 'descriptive' word 'promise. 111 47 
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Thus to state an institutional fact (e.g., Jones made a prom-
ise) "is already to invoke the constitutive rules of the in-
. · "
48 h. h . h f S 1 ' 1 1 st1tut1on w ic , int e case o ear es examp e, pace 
Jones under an obligation requiring that he "ought" to do 
what he has promised to do: "if a person p r omises he is 
committed to doing the thing promised, and this is purely in 
virtue of the [ins ti tutionaJJ meaning of 'promise. ' 1149 This 
commitment exists because the person making the promise 
has implicitly accepted the institution~~ if you will, 
"game") of promise making. That is, he has agreed to "under-
take to use the word 'promise' in accordance with its literal 
meaning, which literal meaning is determined by the internal 
constitutive rules of the institution. 1150 But has he, or 
has he merely uttered words with the intention of making 
others believe that he has so agreed? 
From the a b ove discussion we can see that the "ought" 
Searle has derived is a purely institutional one. No con-
sideration h as been given in the course of its derivation 
to extra-insti t utional facts and values. In view of the 
fact that human institutions are constituted by rules or 
conventions, his "ought 0 is conventional. Searle cannot 
(nor does he intend to) give us any criteria by which we 
can determine whether or not his "ou ght" ought to be ad-
hered to. This would in v olve questions external to the in-
stitution, and he has provided no way of addressing them. 
Searle acknowledges this point: 
"Nothing in my account commits one to the 
conservative view that institutions are logical-
ly unassailabl e or to the view that one o,ught to 
ap p rove or d i sappro v e this or that institution. 
The point is merely that when one enters an insti-
tutional activity by invoking the rules of the 
ins t itution one necessa r ~l y c ommits oneself in 
such and such wa y s, reg ardl ~ ss of whether one ap-
pro v es or disappro v es of the institution~ In the 
case of lin g uistic institutions, like promising 
(or statement makipg), the serious utterances of 
the words coITu~it one in ways which are determined 
by the mea n ing of the words. 11 51 
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This at least would be the p rima facie expectation generated 
on the part of one's hearers by somebody who uttered a prom-
ise under conditions whi c h caused the utterance to be seen 
as "serious." However, just as Searle's linguistic conven-
tionalism provides no means of evaluating institutions en 
b loc, it likewise provides no way to approve or condemn a 
practice of selecti ve conformity to them. Take the individ-
ualistic egoist, for e xamp le, who chooses t ') use the insti-
tution of promising (and other institution s ) to his best ad-
vantage, keepin g his promises when this suits his purposes 
and disregarding them when he finds this course more ad-
vantageous. He places himself above the institution, neither 
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approving nor disapproving it per se, but viewing it as some-
t h ing to be taken ad v antage of for his own ends. For instance, 
the general exp e cta ,-i on that pro mises will be kept will prove 
useful in having his own believed. Thus it is not quite true 
that "by invoking the rules of the institution one necessarily 
commits oneself in such and such ways." One may intentionally 
invoke the rules of the institution insincerely for one's own 
purposes. The commitment of which Searle speaks may never be 
made. Since Searle is fond of comparing institutions consti-
tuted by . linguistic rules with gru~es which are constituted by 
rules prescribing certain forms of behavior, the following 
illustration may be fruitful. Consider a baseball pitcher 
who can get batters out more effectively when using an il-
legal pitch. When it is to his advantage to do so (when he 
can get away with it) he throws this pitch. When the umpires 
are on . the alert to look caref u lly for it, however, he re-
frains. The fact t h at h e has engaged in the institutional 
activity of playing baseball is prima facie e v idence that he 
has coromitted himself to behaving in accordance with the 
rules of the game. That this is not necessarily the case we 
have pointed out. Furthermore, as long as he takes the 
stance that he is a bo ve the institution, obeying its rules 
only when this suits his purpose, like the individualistic 
egoist he cannot be called to account (except within the 
framework of the institution) on the basis of rules which 
are entirely internal to the institution. In order to do 
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this a meta - institutional principle to the effect that "when-
ever one explicitly o r implici~ly makes a cow~itrnent to abide 
by the rules of an institution, one should honor that commit-
ment" would be required. Such a principle is not available 
to Searle, and thus he has no grounds for disapproving the 
egoist who plays fast and loose with institutional rules. 
Searle's "oug h t" is a purely conventiona l one, having no ob-
jective status be y ond the bounds of the re l evant conventions, 
a nd, as we h ave seen, he prov id es no criteria for evaluatin g 
conventions. His "ought" is not to be found in nature; as 
Veatch puts it: " ... just as the binding or obligating charac-
ter of rules in baseball by no means implies that such rules 
must be on the order of natural law, so also the mere fact 
that certain lin g uistic rules authorize the derivation of a 
moral "ought" from an "is" in no wise e n tai l s that such 
"oughts" must be natural "ou ghts" or "oughts" determined by 
anything like n a tural laws. 1152 Searle's contention that he 
has refuted the main traditional argument against the possi-
bility of deriving ethical statements from factual, descrip-
tive ones by demonstrating that evaluative statements (of 
which ethical state me n ts are a sub-class) can be derived 
from purely descriptive ones must be seen with this in mind. 
He has, in the last analysis, provided no more of a refuta-
tion of the institution manipulating egoist than did Taylor. 
The immediately preceding discussion is not intended to 
imply that Searle's derivation fails on the institutional 
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level. That is to say, it is here acknowledged that his in-
stitutional obligation ("ought") has been successfully de-
rived fro m the initial s ta tement of Jones olus the invocation 
~ 
of the relev a nt constitutive rules and the additional prem-
ise relating to t he serious intent of Jones to in fact utter 
a promise. What I am calling into question is the signifi-
cance of the derivation for ethics. To the person who places 
himself "above" the institution it has little significance, 
and for ethical principles to be established as objectiv e in 
a meaningful sense of the term some rebuttal to the indi v id-
ualistic e g oist (or other subjectivist) would appear to be 
required. In the case we have been considering such an i n -
dividual, who views institutions as tools to be utilized for 
the furtherance of his own ends, may freely accept Searle's 
derivation without it having th e slightest impact upon his 
meta-institutional position. Possibly, Searle would agree 
with this; in that case, however, are his results not trivial 
as far as the development of actual ethical norms binding on 
all persons (regardless of their institutional affiliations) 
is concerned? The sort of "ought" that Searle has derived 
from an "is" does not appear, in Veatch's words "to revive 
the possibility that there are such things as natural laws 
and natural norms af t er all. 11 (See footnote No. 33.) In 
whatever (institutional) sense of the term Searle has de-
rived "objective 11 ethical precepts, it is not in the sense 
of "objective 11 that we are concerned with in this thesis. 
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If Searle is not attempting to derive "objective" ethi-
cal n orms in my se n se of the term, why have I bothered to 
critically ex amine his derivatio n of "ought" from "is"? The 
reason is t ha t his mrk has been see n by some as pointing to-
ward so met h ing more tha n the merely conventional "ought" 
which we have discussed. Veatch for one talks about the pos-
sibilit y of interpreting Searle, "at first glance," as at-
tempting to lead the analysts into the camp of the natural-
law philosophers! Se a rle's work ca n , I think legitimately 
be seen in some sen s e as a reaction against the more e x treme 
s ubjecti v i s t tendenci e s of earlier anal y tic ethical philoso-
p h ers (e.g. , the emotivists). Part of the problem of inter-
pretation lies with Searle's first version of the "ought" 
f r om "is" derivation published in the Philosophical Review. 
We have not exa mined it here since Searle himself re g arded 
the later v ersion in Speech Acts as superior. The difficulty 
l ies in the fact that the ceteris paribus c o n siderations, 
left out of t h e Speech Acts derivation pr o per, were inc o rpor-
ated wi th i n the earlier version. Thus two senses of "ought" 
were involved, the purely institutional "ought" and a meta-
institutional one. It is not difficult to see how they could 
be confused, with the conseq uence that Searle co u ld be taken 
as arguing for (or at leasi hinting at) t h e possibility of 
establishing a much wider thesis than the merely institution-
al one he more clearly argues for in the Speech Acts version 
of the derivation. Be as it may, the essent i al point that I 
want to make is that in no way can Searle's "ought" be 
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legitimately held to have significance outside of the narrow 
institutional framework within which it was derived. 
SARTRE: GOOD FAI TH 
At first glance it may appear strange to consider Sartre 
or any writer in the non-theistic existentialist tradition 
in a thesis dealing with purportedly objective ethics. As 
far as Sartre in particular is concerned, does not his famous 
dictuin that man is a being in whom "existence precedes es-
sence" (an ontolo g ically "free" being--contingent, undeter-
min e d, and behold e n t o n o a pr i ori values) rule out the 
p o s si bility of any s ort of obj e ctive ethical norms? Is it 
n ot the case f o r Sar t re t h at all v alues and distinctions be-
tween right a n d wro n g originate in the absolutely free re-
solves of hu.~an subjects with the consequence of a complete 
inter-subjective relativity of morals? While such conclu-
sio n s may appear at first sight to be necessary, Sartre him-
self does not consistently draw them ·. Rather he makes some 
I ( 
startlingly apod{ctic ethical pronounc~ments concerning one's 
obligation to ma..'k.e moral choices in "good faith" in a manner 
which respects t Le concrete freedom of others. At this 
point I should note that I am considering only Sartre's 
early, existentialist thought, with no notice given to his 
later, Marxist notions. Specifically, I am concerned with 
Sartre's ethics up to and including the 1946 essay, The 
Human ism of Existentialism. In ethics, as in other areas, 
his early thought revolves primarily around an individual, 
self-interest perspective. 
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For Sartre the ontological freedom, noted above, is ba-
sic for man, and in no way sterns from or depends upon his 
i n teract.ion with others; however, he draws a surprising con-
clusion from or perhaps in spite of this dictum: "Of course, 
freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, 
but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want 
others to have freedom at the sarne time that I ·want my own 
freedom. I can take freedom as my goal only if I take that 
53 
of others as a goal as well." There is a confusion between 
an ontological position and a normative, ethical one in this 
sentence, an attempt, as it were, to derive an "ought" fro m 
a? "is," something Sartre himself rules out of court in Being 
and Nothingness where he states that "ontology itself cannot 
54 formulate ethical precepts" · because "imperatives" cannot 
be derived from its "indicatives." As far as abstract, 
ontolGgical freedom is concerned, Sartre holds - that we have 
it whether we want it or not. Furthermore, it is certainly 
not true that one must want it, either for himself or for 
others. Indeed, Sartre himself points ou t that this freedom 
is a source of anguish and despair, and that most people 
---- -~-... -
would prefer the comfort and security of absolute a priori 
essences and values even while, contradictorily -, desir _ing 
the freedom to create their own essences. This is the 
47 
des i ~~ .J: o b e a being-~n.-itselt-fo ~-itself; a s Hazel Barnes 
p u ts it : 1'They wish to realize the f r ee dom which distin-
r 
gu'i s hes t h em f r om things and the other creatures in nature 
and at th e s ame t i me to possess the i r abso lu teness. 1155 
- . __ ,.,_ ... ,._ ~- ... 
Whe r e c onc ret e free dom enters the picture (e.g., free-
dom of movement, political freedo m) it is not at all clear 
why one should want it for others even on the assumption that 
one wants (has chosen i t as a value) for oneself. Yet 
Sartre ass e rts with respect to concrete freedom in the con-
te x t of engagement with oth ers that one can take his own 
freedom as a goal only if he takes the freedom of others a s 
a goal also. Barnes atte mpts to make a coherent ar gument 
out o f Sartre's mani festo-lik e pronouncements to this effect 
in L'Existentialisme est un h umanisme. She puts it as fol-
lows : "Since I reco gn ize that freedom is my essence, both 
as myself and as a human being, I cannot truthf u lly deny 
~ ...,_ ---- - -. . 
that the same is true for all other p ~ rsons. Their --l r-ee dom 
is as much a part of the data as my own. 1156 This argument 
sa y s, in effect, that if I am free by virtue of t .J:i.e fact th at 
•. _.\ ... .,._ ....... ...... 
<::::t:.....,;.:,;;~ ----- ,...:.,_, """'.,. 
I am a human being, it must follow _ tha~ alJ other huma~ be-
ings are also free. Affirming the antecedent, Barnes con-
cludes the consequent. Th ere is something suspic i ous, from 
an e x istentialist standpoint, of talking about freedo m as 
"my essence," since Sartre strongly denies the existence of 
any fi x ed human essence . It would have b e en better had 
Bar n es referred to f r eedom as the ultimate existential real-
.-. .. ,.. . •. . .. 
ity of th e human c o ndition. This, I believe, is what Sartre 
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meant when he referred to freedom as the "definition of man," 
~ -
acknowledging that this formal freedom does not depend on the 
t-h . o ___ er in any way. This is not, however, the crucial fault of 
Barnes' argwnent; the problem lies rather in an illicit slide 
from abstract, ontological freedom (th E htunan condition) in 
the antecedent to concrete freedom of action for o t her persons 
as an implication o f the consequent. This is seen in the 
im.~ediate continuation of the above passage: "therefore [my 
emphasis] if I declare that the development of my own free 
projects is the goal and good of my life, I must--if I am in 
good faith--allo w simultaneously that my freedom holds no 
privileged place over this assertion when it is made by some-
one else." 57 It is one thing to affirm in "good faith" that 
in the absence of God all men are existentially free--unde-
termined, contingent, and beholded to no a priori values. 
It is something quite different to maintain that any given 
individual, in acting concretely under these circumstances, 
,.._,~.- ....... -,-:--,---.--
...,. __ .. _ 
has an obligation to respect a concrete freedom of action on 
.-------
. . 
the- -part of others. 
--- -· 
Slice it as you like, the second does 
~-- .. 
not follow from the first. Thus Barnes has failed to show 
that Sartre's ontological freedom entails any responsibility 
toward others; if her elaborated formulation of Sartre's 
L'Existentialisme est un humanisme argument is a valid repre-
sentation of his position (and I believe that it is), then 
it follows that Sartrean existentialism fails to refute the 
egoist's proclaimed right to use others strictly as objects 
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to facilitate the achievement of his own freely chosen goals. 
It avails the defender of Sartre no t hing to appeal at 
this point to the failure of those who seek to "use' .' others 
t o achieve their purported ontological p u rpose, the appropri-
ation of the ot her 's transcendent freedom. It is not neces-
sary to attempt to untangle t h e complex web of Sartrean no-
tions of being-i n -situa t ion with others in order to make the 
basic point, once again, that whatever the ontological si t u-
ation, ca n not, in and of itself prescribe ethical " ou gh ts." 
It may be unavo idab le that we encounter and interact with the 
being-for-itself of others; it does not follow from this t hat 
we have a duty to somehow respect the other's subjectivity. 
The Dutch philosopher, l,uijpen insists that "The other's 
. . h . . f ' ' h' b' . . ..ss right is t e minimum o my yes to _,is su J ecti vi ty. 
Veatch respouds " ... just why should I or anyone e l se imagine 
that he is in any way bound to say 'Yes' to another's sub-
jectivity. Why not say "No' to it, and be damned! 1159 
Respecting the concrete freedom of othe+s is a "good 
faith" choice for Sartre. We have seen that he fails to make 
a convincing case, on existentialist grounds, for the exist-
ence of a moral obligation to choose this freedom. The same 
sort of argu..rnent t h at we have employed with respect t _o the 
specific "good faith" choice of the other's freedom may be 
brought to bear on the logically prior question: Why should 
we choose in "good faith" at all? Why not choose in "bad 
faith"? It will be recalled that to choose in good faith 
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is to choose in a manner which recognizes and is faithful to 
man's existential situation. That is, man is seen to be left 
alone in the world to provide meaning and purpose for his 
existence. There is no God to p ro vide values, no inevitable 
historical determinism to obviate individual choices, no 
fixed human essence to provide a source of a priori goals, 
and no necessity of existence of a ny individual person. If 
one accepts all of this ontological baggage there still does 
not fo _llow any moral "oughts" concerning one's choices of 
actions and world views. If one chooses to act as though 
God exists and has handed down revealed values to guide hu-
man conduct, the worst that a Sartrean existentialist is 
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entitled to say about him is that he is in error in being 
inconsistent with himself. There are no existentialist 
gr o unds for claiming that one "ought" not act in such a way. 
If, for example, someone who s h ares Sartre's ontology never-
theless says that he finds his life more satisfying b~ acting 
as if there was a God, Sartre has no basis for condemning 
him on ethical grounds. Veatch discusses this problem in 
the following passage: 
"The challenge was that the existentialist 
must show the grounds on which it might be sup-
posed that any human subject was under an obliga-
tion--a moral obligation--to make authentic choices. 
Apparently the answer to this challenge took the 
form simply of pointing out that man is a free be-
ing, and then going on from there to exfoliate just 
what is involved in such a notion of freedom. Yet 
how, from the fact that man is free in his choices, 
is one able to infer that he is under an obligation 
to make his choices in a certain way? Or, put a 
little differently, supposing that man is free, why 
shou l d the me re fact that he is so make it wrong for 
h im t o pretend that he is not, or to try to conceal 
from himself his true con di t i on? Is t h is not to de-
rive an "ought" or an "o u ght not 11 from an "is"? An d 
do es this n ot g o diametrically counter to what we 
h a v e seen was the initial step which the existential-
i sts, no less decisively than the an alysts, would 
a p pear to ma ke? It was j ust the . step of proclaim i ng, 
to borrow Olafson's words, that 'no property that a 
sit u ation might be discovered to h ave could possibly 
d e termine by itself the va l ue of th at sit u ation.' 
How, t h en, from the fact that the existentialist fan-
cies that he has discovered th a t man has the property 
of bei n g free can he infer t h at man is under obli g a-
ti on to mak e choices in full recognition and acknow-
le dg ement of t h at freedom? ... Surely, if an e x -
i stentialist ma ke s a mov e of this sort, then his 
ethics is indeed, if not a natural-la w et h ics in the 
u s ua l se n se, then at least an ontologically grounded 
ethics. 11 60 
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There is an interesting similarity bet ween Sartre's argu-
ment and that of Gerwith, examined earlier. Where Gerwith 
failed to show that normative rights to co n crete freedom a n d 
well- b eing follow from the putative definition of man as a 
p r ospective, purposive agent, Sartre failed to ground si milar 
ri g hts in a definition of man as an ontologically free b e in g . 
Both ar g ~~ ents are unsuccessful attempts to derive an ethi-
cal "ought 11 from an ontological "is." 
VEATCH: AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS 
Veatch agrees with us in rejecting t h e three meta-ethi-
cal theories which we have exa mi n ed to this point, maintain-
ing that theories of g oodness and moral imperatives which are 
without an ontological basis must inevitably lead to rela-
tivism and "n ihil i sm." Since eg oi sm may be regarded as a 
spe c ies of relativism (un less a fixed or constant human na-
ture is assumed), this implies that th ey are internally un-
able to meet the chal len g.e of the individualistic egoist. 
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The authors of eac h of the three theories we hav e so far con-
s i dered all attempt, in various way s, to derive a moral ob-
ligat ion to respect a certain right or rig h ts of others. 
However, on the basis o f t heir own initial assu mptions (or 
axiom s, if yo u will) they are unable to bring this off. Thus 
the e goist or relativist can undermine their theories fro m 
wit h in, and such s ubversi ve activity can be countered only 
by further, ad h oc, moves. Veatch, in contrast with th e 
a bov e theories, seeks to place values (good nes s) on an ob-
je ctive footing by demonstrating that they hav e an ont o logi -
cal status in natur e or reality a s superv e nient properti es . 
In connection wi th Veatch we have been bandying ab out 
rather loosel y s~1ch expressions as "on t olog y of morals" and 
"on tological status." It is time to say something about what 
we mean. As will quickly be c ome apparent, "ontology" for 
Vea tch is quite different from what it is for Sartre. Let 
Ve atch speak for himself: " ... why not frankl y ac kn owledge 
that for an yo ne t o take ethics as so mehow pres up posing an 
ontol ogy i s indeed to i mpl y that moral and ethical dist ~n c-
t ions--distinctions be twe en good and bad, rig h t a n d wrong, 
ought and ought not, etc.--are someho w g rounded i n the very 
being and nature of things? 1161 Elsewhere he comments: "We 
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are us i ng t he expression 'ontology of morals or ethics' to 
si g nify j ust that type of ethical theory which seeks to lo-
cate ethical and value distinctions in the facts, independ-
entl y of their being desired, and not as a mere function of 
their b e ing desired. 1162 In another passage we read: 11 
in inquiring as to the 'on tolo g ical status' of goodness, we 
mean to inquire as to the obj ective and, in this se n se, in-
de f ~ndent stat u s of good n ess as it is in the world and apa r t 
from us hum an beings and our feelings and reactions to 
things. 1163 Finally, Veat c h describes "the ontology of na-
t u ral law" as i nv olving a claim for "an obj ective status in 
nat u re for things like norms, standards, values, laws, etc. 11 6 4 
It will be seen that Veatch uses the term "objective" in the 
same way in wh ich I loosely defined it near the beginning of 
this thesis. 
In his book , For an Ontologv of Morals, Vea tch attem pt s 
to ans we r what he c o nsiders st o ck objections to t he possi-
bility of an ont o lo gy of morals. . He then goes on to sketch 
the outlines o f such an o n tology in terms of an Aristotelian-
Thomistic notion of the actualization of potentialit ie s. 
Following this, he makes a few comments on the epis t eE,olog y 
of morals. I shall comment only briefly on the f irs t of 
thes e s teps, li mit ing my self to expositi on . The seco n ' ste p 
s hall req u ire a cr i t i-::;al examinat i on, while the t h ird shal l 
s e rve as a tra n sition t o the last section of this t: esis. 
TLe fi :::-st ob j ection t , the pos s i bility of an onto l ogy of 
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morals which Veatch considers is based on Moore's "open ques-
tion" argwnent. This challenge argues from the purported 
indefinab i lity of goodness to its unreality. That is, if 
good n ess can n o t be def in ed in terms of the existing entities 
and characteristics thereof found in realit y , h ow can it have 
an y reality of i t s own? (While Moore, himself, did not draw 
such a conclusion from his "open question" argument, holding 
rather that goodness was a "supervenient property," later, 
analytical philosophers did.) Veatch counter-attacks by re-
jecting what he sees as a Moorean analyticity requi r eme nt 
for definitions, holding that "If one t hinks of def i n i tion 
in a common-sense way as being nothing but a desire fo r stat-
ing what essentially this, that, or the other given th i ng is, 
then immediately it becomes clear that there j u st aren't a dy 
definitions in this sense that are not open to questi o n . 1165 
"Real" definitions, claims Veatch are always capable of b e -
ing doubted, since fallibility in describi ng and delimiti n g 
the esse n ce of things is unavoidable. Thus Veatch ho l ds 
that he has cleared the way, in p rinciple (at least -a s far 
as this objection is concerned), to defining goodness "direct-
ly in terms of certain of the features or properties of the 
real world. 1166 
The sec ond objecti o n to the possibility of goodness be-
ing an objective quality or property of things revolves 
around the notion t h at it must involve some sort of responses 
on the part of a subject (e.g., desiring, approving, commend-
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ing, etc.). Thus Hare objects that if calling something 
"good" means no more than ascribing certain specifiable, ob-
jective prope rt i es to it, then it would be impossible ever 
to use "good" as a term of co mme n dation, a connotati on which, 
langu ag e use teaches us, belo ng s to the term. If, for ex-
ample, to call a strawberry "go o d" simply means that it is 
s we e t , red, ju i c y , etc., then one could never commend a straw-
ber r y t hat h ad t he se pr operties b y calling it "good." Hare 
concludes f rom this that rat he r th an being an objecti v e p r o-
pert y of things, goodness is found to s tem from subjecti v e 
responses to thing s . 
In order to be able to understand Veatch's response to 
-
this second objection, it is first necessary to loo k at his 
concept of t he actual ontological s t atus of goodness. Veatch 
h ol ds, in acc or da.nce with the Thomistic tradition, th a t g ood-
ness, like be in g, is to be found in all of the Aristotelian 
categori e s, and conse que ntly is not definable per gen us and 
difference. He t hen points out that the "act - potency dis-
tinc tion " is a basic tenet of Aristotelian meta-physics, 
,and draws an a na logy between this dyad and the following ones: 
perfect-impe r fect, complete-inco mplete, developed-undeveloped: 
" ... insofar as I am not ac tu ally informed a bou t 
so met h i ng or oth e r, but on ly able to be so ; or 
inso fa r as the seed is able to sprout and gr ow 
and de v elop into the full- g rown plant, bu t has 
not a c tually done so; or insofar as the coiled 
spring h as a potential e n ergy, alth o ugh there 
has been no actual release of that e n ergy--in 
all such cases a potentiality or mere capacity 
may be compared to t he corresponding a nd correl-
a t i ve actuality, as the imperfect to the pe r fect, 
t h e inco mplete to t h e complete, the undevelo p ed 
to th e de v eloped. It is as if a mere pote n cy just 
as su c h so meh o w b espeaks a c ertain lac k , o r i mper-
f ectio n , of whic h the actuality for its part is 
si mply the fulfillment or completion. 11 67 
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On the b a sis of the above Veatch hazards a defin i tion of good-
ness a s " ·1o thing mo r e or less than the act u al as compared 
wi th t h e p otential, and in the very sense of t h e perfect or 
comp le te as compared with th e im p ..>.r fe c t or inco mp l~ te. " 68 
Th i s d efinition, Veatch bel ie ves, a l lows f or an intelligibl e 
wa y o f describi n g good n e s s a s a s u p er v enient pr o pert y . Thu s 
. 
the e mp irically obser v a b l e pr o per t i es of th in gs c a n be 
sources of v alue or good n ess "just i n so f ar as they are pro-
perties t h at evidence t h e perfection of complet e a c tuali t y 
of t h e thi n g in questio n ." 69 
We are n ow in a position to look at Veatch's a n swer to 
t h e objec t ion that goodness mu st stem from the e v aluative 
resp on se of a su b je c t or s ubjects. He co n cedes so me force 
to t h e objection, ac k nowledging that goodness cannot be con-
sidered as "the sort of objective property that simply ex-
ists t h ere in the object, in s p lendid isolation from any and 
all relations h ips to a s u bject and to such pro-attitudes as 
t h at subject may evince ..• " 70 Veatch rather f i nds goodness 
or val u e to be "itself a kind of relational pro p e rt y , j u st 
in the sense that it points up the objective pr o perties of 
the object as being themsel v es the termeni of a relation: 
57 
they are but the fulfillment or actuality of a p r ior poten-
t iality which was ordered to those nrooerties [my emphasis] 
just insofar as they constitute the fulfillment or perfection 
of s uch a p ot entiality. 1171 Wit h regard to Hare's strawberry, 
Veatch maintains that "To call it good is simply to illumi-
nate those objective properties of the berry in a new light, 
e x hibiting them as c onstituting the perfection and fulfill-
ment of wh at a strawberry might be and could be and, in the 
1 ht t b .,72 non- mora se n se, oug o e. Veatch is attempting to 
steer between the alternati v es t h at: 1) things are desired 
simply because they are "go o d, " and 2) things are good only 
because they are desired . His position is obviousl y much 
closer to the first alternative, but is somewhat more in-
vol v ed. Thing s are desired, for Veatch, beca ~s e they have 
c ertain p roper t ies and those properties are seen as c onsti-
tuting t h e actualization or perfection of the thing in ques-
tion. He rejects the second alternativ e e n t irely on the 
grounds that it would rule out giving reasons in ethics. To 
the question, "why do y ou desi r e X?" (assuming that things 
are good only because they are desired), one could only an-
swer by citing causes, not reasons. Under this assumption 
value and moral j u dgments would be reduced to arbitrary pre-
ferences from the standpoint of reasons. As in the ca se of 
Hare's question as to why X likes spinach, the a n swer is 
that he ju.st likes it, that's all • . But, Veatch maintains, 
moral judgments do not fit this model; where they are con-
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cerned reasons immediately become relevant. Wh0 n we say th a t 
s omething is good we mean something ot h er than that we h a "Je a 
desire for it (we may mean this also}. This i s show n by t he 
fact that people frequently ac k nowledge h a v ing desires for 
things that they would agree are not good. Nevertheless, 
Veat c h concedes that goodness can't be understood wi thout 
(though it is not to be defined in terms of this factor) some 
reference to the subjecti v e factor of desiring, approving, 
commending, etc. In spite of this he holds that ethics 
ca n still be reasonable. He exp l ains how this is held to 
follow from his definition of goodness: "If one underst a nds 
goodness as b eing b ut the actual as over against the p ot en-
tial, or the perfect toward which the imperfect is o r dered 
[my enp hasis}, then while goodness is indeed understood as 
the a c tual or perfect, precisely insofar as it is desired 
or ai med at by that wh ich is still on l y potential, it still 
d o e s no ~ mean t h at such actuali t y a nd perfection are what 
they are only by virt ue of their being desired or aimed at. 1173 
There is ~uch in the way of criticism that could be 
said conce r ni n g Veatch's ontology and definit i on of goodness. 
The pro c edure to be followed here, however, will be to grant 
him his definition and then uee whether or not it is poss-
ible to get an "c bjective" morality or ethics from it. 
Veatch has de n ied that actuality a n d perfection are what the y 
are by virtue of their being desired or aimed at. It is f air 
then to ask, just how a r e they what they are? This qu e stion 
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i s also per t ine n t to Veatch ' s notion of natural law which he 
consi d ers as nothing more t h an the ordering of potency to 
it s a pp ro pr iat e act (e.g., an acorn is "or der ed " to develo p 
into an o a k, a tadpole into a frog, etc.). It is one thi n g 
to de termi n e empirically t h at acorns, under certain circum-
st a nces, develop into oak trees, or that strawbe r ries, u nder 
app ropria t e conditions , b e come red, sweet, a nd juicy. It 
is s omethi n g quite different to sa y that t hese are their re-
sp ective p erf ections or a c tuali z ations, and t h at t h e v , n on-
morally "o ug h t" (whate v er t h is means) t o att a i n such st a tes. 
In ord e r for c e rtain s tat e s of trees, strawberries, men, 
etc. to b e co nsidered as perfected or complete d s t ates, is 
-
i t not necessary to posit a creator-designer who has "or-
dered" them to such states? Otherwise, for ex ample, on 
what grounds do we call a fully developed, healthy, fruit-
ful tree more p er f ect th an a stunted, dise a sed, barren one? 
Certainl y not (for Vea t ch) because the former is more a e s-
t h etically ap pe aling and desirable _from the standpoint of 
human sub j ects. That a certain state of so mething is re-
garded as t h e "perfected" or "co mpleted" state of that t h i n g 
implies that s ome consciousl y purpos iv e being has desig n ed 
t h e t h ing in qu e stion and intended that it should culminate 
i n t h at s t ate. Th ese not i o ns fail to make se n se otherwise. 
Ve a tch a p pears to feel t his in two passag e s which have al-
ready been cited where I u n derlined the refere nces to t he 
o rderi ng of t h e potential or i mperfec t . Surely such order-
ing i mpl i es an order e r. I n his discussion of natural laws 
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Veatch thinks that i n "determining the exact ontological sta-
tus of laws as they exist and are operative in the real world, 
we ma y happily disregard the question of the origin of the 
law--i.e., law as it is the mind of God or of the lawgiver 
(in mensurante)--and confine our atte n tion simply to law as 
given and hence as it exists in fa c_ and in nature (in men-
surato). ••74 But a "law " without a lawgiver is no law at all. 
Veatch leaves us wi th nothing more . than inductive general-
izations, and he would be among t he first to tell us that 
one can't get an ''oug h t" (moral or "non-moral") from these 
since he agrees with Hare (against Searle} that an evalua-
tive sense must alre ady be incorporated in a key factual 
premise in order to derive an "ought" from an " i s." Where 
is suc h an evaluative sense to be found without an orderer, 
a lawgiver? Ce r tainly not in inductive generalizatio ns deal-
ing with the biological development of seeds, acorns, etc. 
Veatch's in tere st is in morality, not biology. Conse-
quently it is whe n he turns to man in his a t tempt to apply 
h is Aristotelian-Thomistic scheme that we must pay the clos-
est attention. The key questions to be addressed are: 1) 
what are t h e actualities/ p erfections of men qua men?, and 2} 
how do we k now we have a n swered the first question correctly? 
Veatch makes reference to wh at he calls the standard of hu-
man nature wh ich "is the sort of thing that must serve as 
o ur standa r d in the pursuit of such humanistic learning as 
is relevant to ethics. 1175 However, he is not very clear on 
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just what this standard is. In one place he defines it as 
"that of being a rational animal. 1175 This does not tell us 
much about what man, ethicall y , "ought" to be--what sort of 
~ttributes and b e havi o r pat te rns are the moral paradigms for 
man . That is, it doesn ' t tell us much in itself. If Vea tch 
is usin g "rational" in a wider sense than th a t of · conformity 
to the laws of logic (and I think that he clearly is), t r n 
we must determine what are t h e particular human attribut E-3 
and b ehavior patterns whi ch __ e subs umes under this ruL r ic. 
Fur t hermore, we mus t determine if Veatch is entitled to do 
so on t he basis of his "ontology of morals." Fort unately, 
he gives us examples of t h e h uman attrib u tes and behaviors 
which he considers as paradigms of t h e actualization of man 
q u a man. In this regard, for example, Veatch cites with ap-
pro v al the bravery a nd "real sense of justice" exhibited by 
So crates in refusing to obey the Athenia n oligarchy of the 
Thirty when they ordered him to participate i n f o rcibly 
bringing in t o their hands a n i n dividual whom they wa nted to 
execute. Elsewhere Veatch refers to the alleged fact tha t 
"all men in their infancy have a potentiality to b ecome ma-
ture, intelligent, and responsible adults" 76 (ob v iously i g -
noring genetic determination to the contrary in s ome cases, 
at least with regard to the intelligence facto r --e.g., 
Down's Syndrome). In another place he refers to wisdom, a 
sense of justice, courage, and self-control as "achievements, 
acco mplishments, ' perfections, which represent but so many 
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ac tualizations of the [a particular] man's prior potential-
. t. 11 77 1 ies. 
It will be recalled that Veatch has defined goodness or 
value a~ the actual or perfect. He has then pointed to cer-
ta in at least in part empirical ly determinable c h aracteris-
tics wh i ch he co n siders to be actualizations or perfections 
of man qua man. Why should we believe h im in this regard? 
If, without a lawgiver, h i s c ase rested on sha ky grounds 
where ac or ns and tadpoles were concerned , it would appear to 
rest on even s ha k i e r grounds wher e man i s concerned. In 
the case of na tur e we could at least rel y on fairly accurate 
inductive gen eralizations co nc erning ho w acorns, tadpo l es, 
-
etc. a ct uall y develop, physiolo g ically, un der certain spe-
cifiable physical conditions. Furthermore, such develop ment 
doesn't require a ny "cooperat ion" on t h e pa r t of acorns, 
ta dp oles, e tc. Thus i t makes some sense, in a re st ricted 
use of the term, to talk about "nat ur al laws" in s uch cases. 
In the case of man, however, Veatch is dealing with ethical 
norm s a nd development, not with pu re ly ph ysiological pro-
cesses whi ch take place independently o f any volition on 
the p art o f the develo p ing subject. Yet he believes that 
the same conce p t of natural law is equally applicable in 
both cases: "It makes no difference whether these natural 
l aws whi c h thus determine the order of potenc i es to acts 
are laws that need to be consciously recognized and acted 
upon, or whether they be laws that are op erative independ-
ently o f t h eir bei ng known; in e i ther case they are nothing 
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other than . a natural order i ng of potencies to acts, and as 
such their ontological status is the same. 1178 In what sense, 
we ask, is a rule or "o rdering" which must "be consciously 
recognized and acted up on" a natural law, and one wi th the 
same ontological status as those "laws" which operate mind-
lessly in nature? Whil e , in the absence of a creator-
designer so u r ce for such laws, I can make some intelligible 
s ense out of the term "natural law" when applied in the lat-
t _r case, I can find no such sense for this expressi o n in 
t h e form e r case. 
We may look at t he p roblem from a slightly differen t 
an g le. In the ca s e o f a man who fails to realize his actual-
i zation or perfection ( i n terms of becoming "a mature and 
resp o nsible ad ult") h is life is, for Veatch, "if not a down-
right failure, then at l east not what it mi gh t have been o r 
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ought to have been." Just what sort of "o ug h t" is this, 
and whe r e do es it come from. If it is a "non-moral ought" 
(Veatch's term, see ab ove) then it would appear that the 
op e rative "natural la ws" do not prescribe moral imperati v es, 
and are therefore irrelevant to ethics. If, however, Veatch 
intends a moral "ought" here (as appears more likely) the 
quest i on is, where does it come from? Why should one be 
morally obliged to actualize his potentiali t ies (assuming 
that it can be determined what t h ese are in the first place) 
as this requires purposive effort wh ich might be expended 
in i nnume ra ble other way s? In the absence of a creator-
designer who has moral authority over his creation, I can 
find no intelligible answ e r to this question. Why not be 
indifferent to the "natural end" of man? 
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Let us return to the matter of Veatch's candidates for 
actualizations or perfections of man qua man. Of these we 
have noted, "a sense of justice" is certainly a key where 
ethics is concerned. In view of the fact that Veatch has 
defined goodness or value in terms of actualization, we may 
ask just wh at is this "justice," a proper sense of which he 
refers to as an actualization? Certainly "justice," whether 
c o nceived retributively or distributionally, is a c oncept 
which is intimately connected to that of right and wrong. 
It has to do with people getting "what they deserve," "what 
they have coming to them," "what they have earned," "what 
they are entitled to," or some such notion. While strict 
deontologists are apt to maintain that "right and wrong" is 
the fundamental ethical distinction, even they would ac-
knowledge its intim a te connection with that between good and 
evil, and Veatch is not a deontologist. Thus •it seems un-
avoidable that his notion of justice can be e xplicated only 
in light of some idea of goodness, with the result that, 
with respect to this particular "actualization," hi s defini-
tion process is quite circular. One needs to have some no-
tion of "good n ess'' in hand before talking about " ju stice," 
yet Veatch has, i n part and with res p ect to human attrib u tes, 
defined the former in te rm s of the latter. Similar argu-
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ments could be constructed with respect to at least some of 
his other putative human actualizations. 
We have seen with respect to the other ethica l theo-
rists whom we have considered that they all wanted to incor-
porate some type of egalitarian principle into whatever full 
fledged system of morality would emerge from their initial 
meta-ethical and / or ethical axioms, but that they were un-
successful in so doing ex cept by means of an ad hoc maneuver 
of some sort. Thus Taylor could not d e rive a duty ever to 
subordinate the fulfillment of one's desire to that of an-
other from his notion of goodness; Searle could never get 
beyond his "institutional" obligations to keep one's prom-
ises (a lt hough in his case it is not a s clear that he con-
sciously sought to do so); and Sartre was unable to justify, 
on the basis of his own ontology, an ethical requirement to 
respect the con crete freedom of others. The case with Veatch 
in this respect is similar. While he does not spell out 
moral requirements to r e spect certain rights and freedoms 
of others in terms of formal principles, it is clear from 
certain of his examples, particularly the one concerning 
Socrates' "real sense of justice," that his concept of the 
actualized or perfected man includes a requirement to be-
ha ve in such a fashion. We have already seen how he fails 
to bring off his scheme of natural laws pertaining to human 
actualization, in the absence of a law-giver. Thus Veatch, 
on the basis of h i s own ontology, has no way to refute the 
individualistic egoist who, for instance, conceives of his 
own actualization in terms of the maximum satisfaction of 
h is personal desires regardless of what this costs i n terms 
of the frustration of the des ir es of others. It would even 
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be difficult to find a "natural law" for human actualization 
in the p urely empirical-inductive sense which we agreed 
makes some sense in animate nature, there being so many 
variant goals and desi re s among human beings. Furthermore, 
even if the egoist agreed with Veatch that there was some 
"n atural end" for man, Veatch has not, in the absence of a 
law-giver with moral authority over man, provided a cogent 
moral argument to the effect that the egoist ought to pur-
sue t his end. 
In fairness to Veatch it should be noted that none of 
the preceding critical discussion implies that he sought 
to establish an ethics which is independent of God in the 
order of being. Veatch is, after all a theist himself who 
operates in the Thomistic tradition. What he has done, how-
ever, in the work which we have examined, is to follow a 
pattern of exposition (an "order of knowledge," if you will) 
in which he purposely precinds from the question of the 
existence of a personal law-giver as the source of his "natur-
al laws" for the development of potentialities in man and 
in ani mate nature as a whole. I have attempted to show that 
t '.1is approach leaves something to be desired. Insofar as 
Veatch fails to make use of his Thomistic ontology (and in 
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the work we have examined he generally fails to do so), he 
does not succeed in making a credible case for the existence 
of "natural laws" and a "natural end" for man. Where he spe-
cifically addresses epistemological questions, Veatch im-
plicitly relies on some sort of intellectual insi g h t. I 
shall make some comments, on the whole favorable, p ertaining 
to this epistemological methodology in the final section of 
this thesis. 
CONCLUDING EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSTSCRIPT 
In th is thesis I have attempted to sho w that four dif-
ferent non - theistic meta-ethical approaches, each representa-
tive of eit he r a contemporary (20th century) or traditional 
way of doing ethics and/or meta-ethics (I have avoided the 
tricky matter of t ry ing to draw a clear di s tinction between 
these), fail to lay the foundation for an objective ethics. 
My method has been to use individualistic ego ism (a form of 
subjectivism) as a foil with which to attack the various at-
tempts of the respective theories to establish as an objec-
tive ethical norm some sort of egalitarian principle by 
which one is morally required to respect the rights (or a 
particular right) of others. An appropriate question to ask 
at this point is what advantage, if any, does atheistically 
based ethics have over the theories we have examined with 
respect to establishing objective norms for human behavior. 
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I am p repared to mainta i n t h at , g ive n the appropriate initial 
assu mpti ons, a theistic system of e ~ _i cs can be established 
wh ich co n ta in s ob j e c t i v e pri nci ples. Suc h a n et h ics will be 
a b l e , on the ba s is of i ts own initial a s s umptions regard i ng 
t h e nature of g oo dne ss a n d the source of moAa l o b ligation, 
be able to repel the e go i st challe ng e. No ad h oc egalitarian 
assumption wi l l have to be brou ght in , o ne which do e s not 
s t em fro m t h e basic ontological tenets of the theistic ethics. 
Thi s is not a clai m t h a t theism and a conse qu e nt theistic 
ethics can b e proved, and eg oism dis p roved. Nev e ~t h eless, if 
true, it puts a th ei s tic e th ics i n a b e tter position, vis-a-
v is egoism and other sub jectivist at t acks than t he o t her the-
ories we h a ve considered. 
In this con c luding sec t ion I try to indicate how an 
e th ics grou nd e d in t h e will o f a divine b eing may establish 
objec t ive norms. I do not a t tempt to outline such an ethics, 
nor to demonstrate the exi s te n ce of God ; both projects would 
go well beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus on the level 
of a clash of ini ti al assumptions or axioms I make no claim 
to have refuted t h e eg oist or an y other non-theistic ethic a l 
approach. In this connection I make a few r e marks about the 
justification of i n itial assumptions; h owe v er, a ful l s cale 
disc u ssion of t h e r e levant epistemological questions is b e-
yond the competenc e of this wr iter. 
Tur~ing t o an ethics grounded i n the wi ll of a divine 
being, wh at sort of initial assumptions need to be made to 
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all ow the deri v ation of obj ec tive norms? One must, I believe, 
start from a concept of the dei t y consistent with the classi-
cal Ju.d aeo-C hri stian notion. God is there vi ewed as an omni-
po te n t, omn i s cient, and b en evolent (good) bei ng who has de-
si gned and created the cosmos including man and his world. 
Goodness is thus seen as an attribute of the divine being, 
God being t h e ulti mate reference point for questions pertain-
i ng to whe the r X is good. Therefore, God does not approve 
of somet h i ng be cause it is g ood independently of Hi m. In the 
field of h uman behavior, it follows that the et h i c all y go od 
is defined by divine commands pertaining to thi s area. From 
these initial p remises of athe i stically groun ded eth i cs it 
is claimed that objective norms in terms o f revealed divine 
commands may be established. These are then binding on a l l 
men, leaving the egoist no way to a v oid their for c e. 
Might a clever egoist or other subjectivist not ask the 
following question: granted that such a God exists, does it 
follow that an . ethical obligation to obe y Him also ·exists? 
Is not an argument to this effect just o ne more attempt to 
derive an "ought" from an "is"? The answer is that there is 
an evaluative sense built into the "is" premise affirming 
God's existence. He h as been defined, in part, as the ulti-
mate standard of goodness in whom there is no evil. It 
follows from this that h is co mmands must be good, and, if 
"right" is defined in terms of advancing, maximizing, etc. 
t h e good, obedience thereto morally right. The stubbon ego-
ist may still ask, why should I do that which is morally 
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r i gh t? This, h owever, is a different s o rt of challenge from 
t h e one we have been dealing with. In asking this que s tion 
the egoist is alread y implicitly acknowled g in g that t he re 
are s u ch thi ng s as objecti v el y good or right ac t ions, a nd 
t h is is all that we are aski n g from h i m. 
It may still be argued t h at we ha ve not, on the b a sis of 
ath e isticall y oriented theory, establish e d the existence of 
objective ethical norms. After all, the claim that there are 
ob j ectively good di v ine co mma n ds and rig h t actio ns i n co n f o rm -
it y with these co mmands do e s not, by itself, strictl y entail 
t he prescriptive st a te ment t ha t "one ought to obey t h e s e c om-
man d s." A further p re mis e, to t he effec t that the co mmands 
of a divine being such ~s we have described above ought to be 
obeyed, is nee d ed, and is this n o t just the so r t of ad hoc 
mane uver t h at we h ave been consider i ng with respect to the 
secular ethical th e ories? I n a sense it is, but it has, I b e -
lieve, an adva n tage in ter ms o f prima facie or initial pla u s-
ibilit y over the analogous mov es which must be made in order 
to obtain objective norms from t h e other t h eories. This is, 
that if on e accepts the existence of a ~ omnipotent, omn iscient, 
bene v olent deity who has re v ealed his will regarding hum an 
conduct, it see ms intuitively na t ural to hold that one "ought" 
to obey the mo rally good commands of this deity, the obedi-
ence to wh i ch are morally right. A similar claim c a nnot , in 
my opinion, hold wi t h reg a rd to the additional pr emises 
necessar y for t h e derivation of objective ethical n orms from 
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th t '- ~cular theories which we have considered . An e i 1i c al r e -
qu i r ment to respect the rights, freedom, , t c. of c t l ; r s dc es 
not "flow" from their basic ontological asslli t1ption s . I n t i.e 
case of t h e di vine command th eor y , howe• ,_rer, if we ag 1 ee that 
it is plausible to ' hold that one ought to obe y the commands 
of the deity, and that among them is to be found a command to 
"lo v e y o ur neighbor as yourself," we have all we need to estab-
lish the latter as a moral imperative. I must ackn owledge 
that all I am claiming here is an ad v antage for a divine com-
mand t h eory vis-a-vis the particular secular theories which 
we have examined. A wider c l aim to the effect that all secu-
lar t h eories must, in principle, fail in any attemp t to 
establish objective ethical n o rms is beyond the scope of t h is 
thesis. 
If I have argued successfully for the above advantage of 
atheistically based ethical theory vis-a-vis the secul a r 
counterparts which we have examined, at what price is this 
advantage obtained? In declaring that goodness is an attrib-
ute of the divine being, I have said nothing determinate 
about its nature. This appears to leave me open to the 
char g e that I am using "good" emotively, as merely a term of 
approbation applied to the deity. In contrast some of the 
secular theories we have considered (e.g., Taylor a nd Veatch), 
wh atever their other shortcomings, do give a content-f u ll 
definition of "good." I am not quite certain what to say i n 
response to this cr i ticism except "so wh at?" Th e f ailure o r 
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inability to specify a determinate nature of "goodness," does 
not~ in itself, entail that the word is being used only in an 
emotive sense. It may be the case that Moore was correct in 
holding that goodness is undefinable. If I have been able 
to make a plausible case for the existence of objective moral 
nor ms on the basis of atheistically based ethical theory, 
one which is noticeably stronger than those which can be mad e 
on the basis of the co mpeting secular theories, I don't see 
why I should be bothered by the failure of the theist i c the-
ory to provide a determi n ate, "definition" (in a Moorean or 
Aristotelian sense) of "go odness." It may, after all, be the 
case that one can know what goodness is only by means of an 
insight into its nature-which cannot be precisely communi-
cated by means of propositions. Into this question, however, 
we shall not delve. 
Once more, it has not been the purpose here to ar g ue for 
the existence of the deity. Questions pertaining to p u r-
ported ph iloso ph ical proofs of God's existence and those deal-
ing with his ontological character (e.g., whether an omni-
potent, omniscient, to tally good God is possible) are far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I have been content with 
the much more modest goal of s how ing that if the initial 
assuinption of t he existence of the Judaeo-Christian deity in 
terms of whom goodness is defined is g ranted, then the ex-
istence of divinely revealed objective ethical norms (a s surn-
ing that God deigns to reveal such things in propositional 
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form) fol l ows. If this is true then a divine ordi n ance the-
ory of ethics has a distinct advantage over the competing 
theor ie s we have examined, if the establis hment of objectiv e 
ethical norms is taken as a goal. 
If it were to be granted that objec t ive et h ical judg-
ments are possible only if a divine so u rce is postulated, 
what would be gained versus t h e subjectivist? He is free to 
re j ect the postulate that a god of t h e s ort we have p r esented 
(or any god) exis t s, and continue on merrily with his sub-
j e ctivism. The basic disagreement is in the area of first 
princi p les, and how is one to prove these? Is it not the 
case that all metaphysical proofs of first principles, in 
ethics, theology, cosmology, etc. must be circular? This 
is not the place for a discussion of the putative philo-
sophical pr o ofs of God's existence; suf f ice it to say that 
a minority o f philosophers today would give them serious 
consi d eration, a nd e v en durin g their h eyday they never ob-
tai n ed anyt h ing like universal accep t an ce . The infinite 
regress pr oblem concerning ded ;__.,:::tive prr ) ofs is well known, 
as is t h e f a ct t h a t any at t emr t o j u stify the principle 
of induction must b e circula r . Sidgw i ck has pointe · out, 
and Roger Hanco ck agrees that fundamental axioms of ethics 
rt 
. cannot b e pro ved a n d must be regarded as kn own di-
rectly, without proof: there i s no clear sense in which we 
can speak of proving or givin g evid en ce for them ,with out 
. l . ..so circu arity. This appears to leave us with re co urse 
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only to some sort of insight regarding f i rst principles. How-
ever, since insights are, by definition, foundational, the r e 
can be no appeal to any criteria for adjudicating between 
competing clai ms which are presented as "insights,'' in ethics 
or any where else. The best that can be done in a dispute is 
to present exam p les and attempt to elicit agreement on gen-
eral principles on the basis of them. This is essentially 
wh at Veatch does when he gi v es illustrations such as that o f 
Socrates' conduct under the Thir t y. Veatch says, in effec t , 
"here is an instance of a true se n se of ju s tice; surely you 
see it as such." 
Where does all of this leave us with regard to the 
establishment of cla im s for first princ i ples in ethics? Not 
very well off, I'm afraid. To the naturalist who asks, "why 
should I believe in the theist's God?" the answer can alwa y s 
be given, "why should I believe that the satisfaction of de-
sires is goo d ?" To the linguistic conventionalist who poses 
the same question, the retort can always be made, "why 
should I believe that I have an obl·gation to conform to 
the rules of an institution just because I have uttered 
words which verbally commit me to do so?" Such examples 
could be multiplied. The proposition that there is such a 
thing as "the moral point of view," one according to which 
the claims of one indivi d ual to some right or good are as 
worthy of respect as similar claims made by anyone else, is 
an example of an unprovable ethical axiom. To use Fishkin's 
-
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terminolo g y neither "internal strate g ies" for justifying a 
particular mor al position, t ha t is, those "based on assump-
tions inter n al to the characterization of morality or the 
moral point of view 1181 [and therefore acknowledging that 
there is s o:ne "moral point of view" to be charact e rized ap-
propriately], nor ''external strategies," that is, those 
which are "based on assumptions independent of the charac-
terization of morality or the moral point of view i tse l f--
assu mptions, f o r exa mple, about God, meta-physi c s, or the 
1 f h . . - . " 82 f 11 . roe o urnanity in t h e uni v erse, can success u y Just-
ify an e th ical position so that it is secure from subjec-
tivist attack. The latter may always reject any particular 
character i.zation of the moral point of view or any particu-
lar funda~ental assumption upon which an external strategy 
of justification is based. .r..s these normally involve funda-
mental or a x io mat i c assumptions, we are brought face to face 
wi th t he basic epistemological problem. 
If we agree with Sidgwick, Mill, Mary Warno ck , and 
others t h at questions of ultimate ends, about what is ulti-
mately desirabl~ are not susceptible to proof, where can we 
go fr om t her e? Herbert Feigl, acknowledging the limits of 
logical de mon stration, is "inclined to say that you won't 
g et any place with ethical justification unless yo u start 
· · · · "
8 3 h · h b . th d w1tn certai n commitments w 1c can e nei er prove nor 
disproved. He defines commitment as the taking of a firm 
attit ude toward som e thing, noting that it "is itself not a 
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knowle d ~e cla im at all." 84 In anoth e r passage Feigl elabor-
ates: 
'' . ethical imperatives must be bas d upon 
a fundame n tal or supreme ethical imperative 
that is u n conditio na l; that is, if your intui-
t i ons are co rre c t, because so . . ewh ere in the 
anal y sis of moral behavior and oral ex pe rience 
we do come upon certain terminal v alues. We 
are not tal ki n g ab out ab s olute values, but some 
that furnish the basis to the r e s t of our values. 
And these are t h e on es to which we conunit our-
se lv es, at l eas t as principles of criticism, 
even if we do not a l way s ob e y them. 11 85 
Feigl' s "conuni trnents" are not knowledge claims, yet t h ey are 
fundamental ethical impe ratives, non-cognitive star t ing 
points or fi r st principles. Their resemblance to the freely 
chos en values of the existentialist is startling. Fr om his 
explana tio n it clearly makes n sense to ask for the reasons 
for ethical corrm1itments. If there were any to be given, then 
the co mmitments would rest upon so meth i n g l og ically prior and 
no lon ge r be first principles. We might perhaps inquire 
after the causes of a given individual's making of a certain 
commitment. Pursuing this line, however, would result in 
epistemology trailing off into psychology. 
Despite the above difficulties with Feigl's notion of 
c ommi L-nent, I believe that he h as touched upon something 
valuable and important which may yet point toward a way of 
av o iding complete epistemo l ogical skepticism. When he talks 
about c o rrect ethical intui t J.ons and terminal values, what 
h e says strikes a resp onsi v e cho r d. This is because mo st 
of u s do in fact s ha r e c ertain £12.ndarne ntal ethical n otions. 
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Sp ea king on an infor mal, cornn1on sense level it may be claimed 
that all but t he most depraved individuals hold certain moral 
principles i n co rr~o n (e.g., that willfu l , unprovoked murder 
is wrong). As a formal argument this i:"tpproach is obviously 
question-begging in its use of "depraved." Nevertheless, 
this to s ome extent common moral consciousness may be seen as 
evidence that genuin e in sights into ethical norms governing 
human behavior are po ssible. Such insights must be based on 
so me notion of moral l y rele v ant value, that is a value such 
that t h e response to i t may be the bearer o f moral predi-
cates s u ch as right and wrong. Stones are not s e en as pos-
ses sing such a value; people are. 
If, f o r the sake of d i scussion we grant the existence 
of morally relevant va lue and the validity of insights based 
t hereo n, we may ask what the necessary conditions for the 
existence of these phenomena are. That is, we may a pp roa c h 
the matter in terms of what may loosel y be described as a 
tr a ns cendental justification. Along this line I would ask 
the followi ng que stion: can morally relevant value and in-
sights pertaining to what constitutes ethical beh a v i or have 
an ontol og ical basis in an impersonal absolute or absolutes 
(e.g ., Platon i c forms)? I have already argued at some 
length t h at they cannot be found in impersonal n ature (the 
failure of atte mpts to derive an '' ought" from an "is"). Is 
the cha nc e substantially better where some s o rt of imper-
son al absolute is brought into the picture? Remember, we 
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are dealing with ethical injunctions concerning personal con-
duct and a unique sort of value pe r taining predominately if 
not exclusively to people. Must not such a value and ethi-
cal norms bas ed on it have its source in a person? If this 
v alue and the insights based thereon are objective and uni-
vers a lly binding, must the personal source not be one akin 
to the Judaeo-Christian notion of God? Such would appear to 
be the case to this writer. 
In tl 1e i n troduction I asked if my definition of "objec-
tive" was such that ethical norms of this sort could only 
eman ate fro m God ? If so a positive statement of my thesis 
would appear to involve a petitio principii. I would be 
asking whether "objective" norms, def i ne d in a way that im-
plied that they werce divinely issued commands, were possible 
withou t a di vin e source. The answer would be, trivially, 
"no." Admittedly I ha v e operated with a definition of 
"objecti ve" which i s somewhat loose. Nevertheless, I do not 
believe that it is a question begging one. The authors 
whose theories we ~ave e xamined have, with the pr oba ble ex-
ception of Searle, attempted to develop and / or show the 
p o ssibility of norms which could be described as objective 
in my sense of t h e term without bring in g God into the pic-
ture. Furthermore, it remains possibl e , in theory, to find 
an impersonal transcendent source of such objective norms, 
though I have atte mpte d to discredit such a move with my 
" t ranscendental" argument. I claim no certainty for its 
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success; indeed I have cla im ed no certainty for the cardinal 
point of this thesis. In view of the obvious strain of 
epistemological skepticism which has been evident throughout 
this closing section, it is clear that I am not prepared to 
defend any claims of certainty where purported propositional 
truths are concerned. This final remark may point toward 
another, experiential notion of truth, one which cannot be 
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